Abstract
Chapter 7 discusses liberal peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, and its positive and unintended consequences. It argues that international peacebuilding in Sierra Leone is a ‘liberal peacebuilding project’ of social transformation, thought to be essential for creating conditions for durable and sustainable peace. It shows that despite international efforts to build effective state institutions and a durable peace in the country, peace remains fragile, with both post-war governments failing to deal with neo-patrimonial politics, which political elites use to entrench their political power.
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Notes
- 1.
The UN family for Sierra Leone consists of 14 UN agencies and programs plus UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone and three financial institutions – the African Development Bank, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
- 2.
UNIPSIL was established in 2008 by the Security Council Resolution 1829. Its mandate included providing political support to national and local efforts for promoting peace; promoting democratic institutions, human rights, and the rule of law, supporting government efforts to stop illicit drug trafficking and international crime; consolidating good governance reforms; supporting decentralization of government, supporting the constitutional review process in the country (UN Security Council/Res/1829, 4 August 2008, [3] (a)).
- 3.
Its fragility was also reflected in the 2014 Ebola outbreak as the country’s weak health system could not contain it without external support.
- 4.
For instance, in its 2009–2011 development plan, the Kailahun District Council notes that the 2001 vulnerability assessment stated that an estimated 80 per cent of the infrastructure in the district required reconstruction (2009). It further notes that, ‘The general standard of living of the populace is very low, with the majority having access to meals of poor nutritional status and drinking water that is not safe’ and also in small communities people live in substandard houses that have ‘become death traps and therefore dangerous to live in’ (Kailahun District Council 2009: 8).
- 5.
For instance, international actors privileged the Special Court for Sierra Leone over the TRC, war victims and customary approaches to peacebuilding. Over US$300 million was spent on the Special Court for Sierra Leone to prosecute nine people who bore ‘the greatest responsibility for the commission of crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law as well as crimes committed under relevant Sierra Leonean law in the territory of Sierra Leone’ (UN 2000: 1; Hoffman 2008). This means that at least $33 million dollars was spent on each perpetrator. Yet, war victims did not receive much support including medical assistance and compensation. In 2009, the President of Sierra Leone launched a trust fund for war victims; however, it has received very little international support (personal interview, NaCSA, December 2009).
- 6.
A local businessman also pointed out that he was finding it difficult to secure a business loan from the Central Bank of Sierra Leone and that state elites and bank officials were prioritizing Lebanese investors over local business persons, particularly local business persons who are not connected to them or who refuse to bribe them (Businessman, personal interview, November 2010).
- 7.
Similar criticisms were raised by a respondent who works for an international NGO who said, ‘They [internationals] are spending a lot of money on expatriates while local staff does most of the dirty work’ (personal interview, confidential source, December 2009). However, ActionAid Sierra Leone was singled out for having a country director who is Sierra Leonean.
- 8.
In rural areas where the state has invited transnational corporations to invest in agricultural land (most of which is customary land), the use of concepts such as ‘agriculture-for-development’ (World Bank 2008b), employment creation and economic growth have led the state and its development partners to consider such investment a key priority. In order to make this more appealing to the rural populace, the use of such concepts has also meant the creation of pathologies in rural areas where there are vast tracts of agriculture land, such as ‘under-utilized land’ and ‘food insecure’. Large-scale farming is viewed as a solution to such pathologies. Since the locals lack capacity to engage in such agricultural activities, multi-national corporations are invited and would be considered crucial for ‘transforming’ the livelihoods of poor local subsistence farmers. This overlooks the fact that such customary land is being kept for future generations. Some of the rural people have come to accept these pathologies, for instance, a town chief told me that ‘We were ignorant about agriculture’ and further pointed out that the community supports the idea of ‘big farms’ (personal interview, Anonymous town chief (a), November 2010). The same town chief noted the lack of basic health services in the chiefdom, particularly a ‘big’ hospital. Critical of the government, he pointed out that the chiefdom had offered 30 acres of land to the government for the purpose of building a hospital; however, the government built a small health center on 4 acres of land and called it a hospital. Further, he noted that the ‘hospital’ has inadequate medicine and bedding, and ‘babies are finding it difficult’.
- 9.
This is despite the fact that such transnational corporations are more interested in biofuel production and cash crops such as oil palm than food crops. Yet, the country has a high prevalence of hunger (in 2010, it ranked 79 out of 84 countries on the Global Hunger Index and in the 2015 Global Hunger Index it scored 38.9, an alarming level). In addition, ordinary farmers complain that the government has failed to support and protect the already existing indigenous farmers.
- 10.
Villagers in Imperi Chiefdom perceive their Paramount Chief as conniving with the government and the rutile mining company. However, national governing structures tend to supersede the authority of the Paramount Chief (see Akiwumi 2011). For instance, part 2.1 of the 2009 Mines and Minerals Act states that ‘All rights of ownership in and control of minerals in, under or upon any land in Sierra Leone and its continental shelf are vested in the Republic not withstanding any right of ownership or otherwise that any person may possess in and to the soil on, in or under which minerals are found or situated’ (Government of Sierra Leone 2009a: 8). This effectively takes away land rights of rural farmers in mineral-rich areas. Yet, the Provinces Land Act cap. 122 provides that ‘protectorate lands are vested in the tribal authority (now chiefdom councils) to manage on behalf, and for the benefit, of community members with land rights’ (Akiwumi 2011: 61).
- 11.
In its 2011 Public Consultation and Disclosure Plan, Sierra Rutile Limited provided the amount it disbursed as surface rent payment to affected landowners in five chiefdoms in Moyamba and Bonthe Districts. For instance, in Imperi Chiefdom the surface rent payment was disbursed as follows – the payment rate was US$12.3 per acre (the figures are quoted in Leones): (1) Bonthe District Development Fund – 126,546,329.70; (2) Constituency Development Fund – 84,364,219.80; (3) Chiefdom Development fund – 84,364,219.80; (4) Paramount Chief – 126,546,329.70; and (5) Landowners – 421,821,141.30. However, the report does not state how many landowners were paid and how much each landowner received.
- 12.
The youth leader pointed out that due to the extended family system land is not owned by a single person. This means that if six million leones is paid to the ‘land owner’ as surface rent, ‘over 55 family members share [it], by the end of the day each gets one hundred thousand leones’ (group interview, youth leader, November 2010). During my fieldwork in 2010, a standard 50 kg bag of rice (the country’s staple food) cost 150,000 leones which is 66.7 per cent of such landowners’ annual surface rent payment, based on the figures the youth leader gave me.
- 13.
Yet, the same critics of the Paramount Chief are quick to point out that ‘we do not disregard the Paramount Chief, though respect for her has been reduced a bit’ (group interview, deputy youth leader, November 2010). Further, such critics have acknowledged that she is good in some way, for instance, in the absence of ambulance services in the chiefdom, she sometimes uses her pickup truck to transport sick villagers to the hospital, that she has established a good working relationship with the youths and also that she knows how to talk to the people. In my interview with the Paramount Chief, she pointed out that she supports the government of the day, although some Paramount Chiefs resist this and also that she is working on bringing her followers together (personal interview, Paramount Chief, Imperi Chiefdom, November 2010). This (supporting the government of the day), of course, sometimes comes into conflict with the interests of her followers who despise central government. In addition, she noted that payments from the rutile mining company for chiefdom development have been used to build a guest house and a chiefdom cell. However, for critics this is not enough and most of the funds meant for chiefdom development are being abused by the ‘so-called figure heads’ – the Paramount Chief and Treasury Clerk as well as senior men and women around them (personal interview, confidential source, November 2010).
- 14.
For instance, in the case of Sierra Rutile mining company, the state has privileged the company’s ‘interests and profits […] through legislation, cheap pricing, tax holidays and reduced royalty payments’ (Akiwumi 2011:59).
- 15.
The same source told me that he has secretly encouraged mine workers to go on strike as he feared that if he openly encouraged them he would get into trouble and at times, he encourages them to engage in hidden forms of resistance, such as stealing from their employers.
- 16.
For instance, a Paramount Chief noted that sustainable peace could only be achieved in Sierra Leone if Sierra Leoneans were self-sufficient and accommodated each other (personal interview, Paramount Chief, Tikonko Chiefdom, November 2010). He further pointed out that self-reliance is important since it limits outside interference – which also could mean an interest in local ownership and autonomy.
- 17.
The same applies when SLPP was in power.
- 18.
President Koroma could also have learnt a lesson from the previous SLPP government whose demise an SLPP official partly blamed on its emphasis on distributing political power evenly in order to avoid regional politics and a return to conflict (personal interview, SLPP Official, November 2010). The SLPP official further pointed out that this brought dissatisfaction within the party since some party members felt SLPP leadership was not being grateful to those who had fought for the party, leading to defections and also the formation of a break away party, PMDC, under the leadership of Charles Margai.
- 19.
Ex-combatants who have faced marginalization in their communities have moved to cities where they have established ‘new families’ consisting of fellow ex-combatants. They have also established their own networks – often calling each other ‘brother’ and ‘sister’ or ‘colleague’. In 2007 elections APC and SLPP political elites re-mobilized and co-opted them as well as ex-prisoners and other marginalized youths for the purpose of providing security to political elites and also for mobilizing votes with violence being used for this purpose (Christensen and Utas 2008: 515). According to Christensen and Utas (2008), Ernest Koroma (presidential candidate for APC) mobilized RUF combatants while Solomon Berewa (SLPP presidential candidate) mobilized West Side Boys. A former RUF commander told me that, ‘Politicians still need us. We are the youths’ (personnel interview, 23 November 2010).
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Tom, P. (2017). Building a liberal Peace in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone. In: Liberal Peace and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa. Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57291-2_7
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