This book shows that the most important factor during this period (1982–1984) was that the levels of political autonomy of both Chile and Argentina to implement their foreign policies were highly dissimilar. This means that their relationships with entrepreneurs, political forces, and their societies were completely different. Taking account of these facts, it is easier to understand the foreign decision-making processes in both countries during the last rounds of the various negotiations.
In a nutshell, the domestic goals in Argentina conditioned the international outcomes such as those for the Beagle dispute. In this sense, it is important to highlight that the predominance of domestic factors over international constraints followed a similar trend as that during the military regime. Internal political disputes and the reorganization of power were thus more influential than international events. The defeat in the Malvinas/Falklands War did not change Argentine armed forces’ policy toward Chile. It was the lack of leverage against internal democratic actors and political conditions that explains their acquisence to end the frontier dispute and that in turn partially explains the bilateral agreement. The decision to cooperate with Chile should be understood from the level of autonomy lost by the military, where civilian control over the armed forces paved the road to ending the bilateral dispute.