Abstract
Williamson’s argument against the psychological view on intuitions and his rejection of intuition-talk are examined. It is argued that doing conceptual analysis does not amount to doing psychology. Finally, the differences between two armchair disciplines—philosophy and mathematics—are investigated.
The second part of the chapter consists in a defence of conceptual analysis. The author argues that the appeal to intuitions is legitimate if one (1) conceives the request of a theory on X as a demand of coherent and precise norms for the use of ‘X’/application of X; (2) takes reflective equilibrium as the method for theory construction and justification; and (3) understands intuitions as the expression of what philosophers think is correct to say in light of their competence and reflection.
This chapter is the extended version of an article, ‘Williamson on the psychological view’, forthcoming in Argumenta (Nicoli 2016).
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Nicoli, S.M. (2016). The Nature of the Philosophical Enterprise. In: The Role of Intuitions in Philosophical Methodology. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56715-4_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56715-4_5
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