Skip to main content

Theoretical Explanations for Firm-Led Governance

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Governing African Gold Mining

Part of the book series: International Political Economy Series ((IPES))

  • 704 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter begins by providing an overview of the resource curse literature, highlighting the existing explanations for failed growth in resource-rich countries. In particular, it is noted that this well-developed scholarship is highly state-centric, ignoring the role of multinational firms. Next, the chapter introduces the cutting-edge scholarship on private authority and private governance, exploring how, why and in what ways firms act as industry governors. This section provides the theoretical underpinnings for understanding firms’ contributions to the governance of Africa’s gold mining sectors. Lastly, Elbra develops a political economy framework through the synthesis of the resource curse and private governance literatures. This framework provides an understanding of how private governance regimes may be used to alleviate the outcomes associated with the resource curse.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2010). Why is Africa poor? Economic History of Developing Regions, 25(1), 21–50. doi:10.1080/20780389.2010.505010.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ahammad, H., & Clements, K. W. (1999). What does minerals growth mean to Western Australia? Resources Policy, 25(1), 1–14. doi:10.1016/S0301-4207(99)00002-1.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Akinlo, A. E. (2012). How important is oil in Nigeria’s economic growth? Journal of Sustainable Development, 5(4), 165–179. doi:10.5539/jsd.v5n4p165.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aman, A. (1999). Administrative law for a new century. In A. Prakash & J. A. Hart (Eds.), Globalization and governance. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, L. (1987). The state in the Middle East and North Africa. Comparative Politics, 20(1), 1–18. doi:10.2307/421917.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ascher, W. (1999). Why governments waste natural resources: Policy failures in developing countries. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Auty, R. M. (1993). Sustaining development in mineral economies: The resource curse thesis. London: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Auty, R. M. (1994). Industrial policy reform in six large newly industrializing countries: The resource curse thesis. World Development, 22(1), 11–26. doi:10.1016/0305-750X(94)90165-1.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Auty, R. M. (2001a). The political state and the management of mineral rents in capital surplus economies: Botswana and Saudi Arabia. Resources Policy, 27(2), 77–86. doi:10.1016/S301-4207(01)00008-3.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Auty, R. M. (2001b). Resource abundance and economic development. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Auty, R. M., & Pontara, N. (2008). A dual-track strategy for managing Mauritania’s projected oil rent. Development Policy Review, 26(1), 59–77. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7679.2008.00398.x.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baldwin, R. E. (1966). Economic development and export growth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baran, P. A. (1957). The political economy of growth (Vol. 7). New York: Monthly Review Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beblawi, H. (1987). The rentier state in the Arab world. Arab Studies Quarterly, 9(4), 383–398.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bell, S., & Hindmoor, A. (2009). Rethinking governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Bernstein, S., & Cashore, B. (2000). Globalization, four paths of internationalization and domestic policy change: The case of ecoforestry in British Columbia, Canada. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 33(1), 67–100. doi:10.1017/S0008423900000044.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boix, C. (1998). Political parties, growth and equality: Conservative and social democratic economic strategies in the world economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Braithwaite, J., & Drahos, P. (2000). Global business regulation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Braudel, F. (1982). Civilization and capitalism, 15th–18th century: The perspective of the world (Vol. 3). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brynen, R. (1992). Economic crisis and post-rentier democratization in the Arab world: The case of Jordan. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 25(1), 69–98.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Burke, P. L. (1999). Embedded private authority: Multinational enterprises and the amazonian indigenous peoples movement in ecuador. In A. C. Cutler, V. Haufler, & T. Porter (Eds.), Private authority and international affairs. Albany: State University of New York Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bush, R. (2008). Scrambling to the bottom? Mining, resources and underdevelopment. Review of African Political Economy, 35(117), 361–366. doi:10.1080/03056240802410968.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Büthe, T., & Mattli, W. (2011). The new global rulers: The privatization of regulation in the world economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Cashore, B. W., Auld, G., & Newsom, D. (2004). Governing through markets: Forest certification and the emergence of non-state authority. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clements, K. W., & Johnson, P. L. (2000). The minerals industry and employment in Western Australia: Assessing its impacts in federal electorates. Resources Policy, 26, 77–89. doi:10.1016/S0301-4207(00)00018-0.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2000). Greed and grievance in civil war. Policy Research Working Paper (Vol. 2355). The World Bank Development Research Group.

    Google Scholar 

  • Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4), 563–595. doi:10.1093/oep/gpf064.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Söderbom, M. (2004). On the duration of civil war. Journal of Peace Research, 41(3), 253–273. doi:10.2307/4149744.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Collier, P., Van Der Ploeg, F., Spence, M., & Venables, A. J. (2010). Managing resource revenues in developing economies. IMF Staff Papers (1 ed., Vol. 57). International Monetary Fund.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cooper, F. (2002). Africa since 1940: The past of the present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Cutler, A. C., Haufler, V., & Porter, T. (Eds.) (1999). Private authority and international affairs. Albany: State University of New York Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dashwood, H. S. (2007). Canadian mining companies and corporate social responsibility: Weighing the impact of global norms. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 40(1), 129–156. doi:10.1017/S0008423907070047.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dashwood, H. S. (2012a). CSR norms and organizational learning in the mining sector. Corporate Governance, 12(1), 118–138. doi:10.1108/14720701211191373.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dashwood, H. S. (2012b). The rise of global corporate social responsibility: Mining and the spread of global norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Davis, G. A., & Cordano, A. V. (2009). Resource booms and the poor. Colorado School of Mines. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1448864

  • Di John, J. (2011). Is there really a resource curse? A critical survey of theory and evidence. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 17(2), 167.

    Google Scholar 

  • Drezner, D. W. (2001). Globalization and policy convergence. International Studies Review, 3(1), 53–78.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ebrahim-Zadeh, C. (2003). When countries get too much of a good thing. In Finance and development (Vol. 40, pp. 50–51). International Monetary Fund.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eggert, R. G. (2001). Mining and economic sustainability: National economies and local communities (Vol. 19). International Institute for Environment and Development.

    Google Scholar 

  • Falkner, R. (2003). Private environmental governance and international relations: Exploring the links. Global Environmental Politics, 3(2), 72–87. doi:10.1162/152638003322068227.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American Political Science Review, 97(1), 75–90. doi:10.1017/S0003055403000534.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics and political change. International Organization, 52(4), 887–917.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fosu, A. K. (1996). Primary exports and economic growth in developing countries. The World Economy, 19(4), 465–475. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.1996.tb00690.x.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, T. L. (2000). The lexus and the olive tree. New York: Anchor Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fukuyama, F. (1992). The end of history and the last man. New York: Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Garrett, G. (1995). Capital mobility, trade, and the domestic politics of economic policy. International Organization, 49(4), 657–687.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Garrett, G. (1998). Global markets and national politics: Collision course or virtuous cycle. International Organization, 52(4), 149–176.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gelb, A. H., & Grasmann, S. (2008). Confronting the oil curse—Proceedings of the 6th AFD-EUDN conference, 2008. Paper presented at the Population and Natural Resources, Paris, France.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gillies, A. (2010). Reputational concerns and the emergence of oil sector transparency as an international norm. International Studies Quarterly, 54(1), 103–126. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00579.x.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hale, T., & Held, D. (2011). Handbook of transnational governance. Cambridge: Polity Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hall, P. A., & Taylor, R. C. R. (1996). Political science and the three new institutionalisms. Political Studies, 44(5), 936–957.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hall, R. B., & Biersteker, T. J. (2002). The emergence of private authority in global governance (Vol. 85). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Haufler, V. (2001). A public role for the private sector: Industry self-regulation in a global economy. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hay, C., & Marsh, D. (2000). Demystifying globalization. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Held, D. (1999). Global transformations: Politics, economics and culture. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Humphreys, M. (2005). Natural resources, conflict, and conflict resolution. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(4), 508–537. doi:10.1177/0022002705277545.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Humphreys, M., Sachs, J. D., & Stiglitz, J. E. (Eds.) (2007). Escaping the resource curse. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Karl, T. L. (1997). The paradox of plenty: Oil booms and petro-states. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (2000). Globalization: What’s new? What’s not? (And so what?). Foreign Policy, 118, 104–119.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krasner, S. D. (1983). International regimes. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lane, P. R., & Tornell, A. (1995). Power concentration and growth. Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, No 1720. Cambridge MA: Harvard Institute of Economic Research.

    Google Scholar 

  • Le Billon, P. (2001). The political ecology of war: Natural resources and armed conflicts. Political Geography, 20(5), 561–584. doi:10.1016/S0962-6298(01)00015-4.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Le Billon, P. (2008). Diamond wars? Conflict diamonds and geographies of resource wars. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 98(2), 345–372. doi:10.1080/00045600801922422.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leite, C., & Weidmann, J. (1999). Does mother nature corrupt? IMF working paper. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leite, C., & Weidmann, J. (2002). Does mother nature corrupt? Natural resources, corruption, and economic growth. In G. T. Abed & S. Gupta (Eds.), Governance, corruption, and economic performance (pp. 159–196). Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leonard, H. J. (1988). Polution and the struggle for world product: Multinational corporations, environment, and international comparative advantage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Luong, P. J., & Weinthal, E. (2006). Rethinking the resource curse: Ownership structure, institutional capacity, and domestic constraints. Annual Review of Political Science, 9, 241–263. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.062404.170436.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mahdavy, H. (1970). The patterns and problems in rentier states: The case of iran studies in economic history of the Middle East. London: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mikler, J. (2011). The illusion of the ‘Power of Markets’. Journal of Australian Political Economy, 68, 41–61.

    Google Scholar 

  • North, D. C. (1990). A transaction cost theory of politics. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2(4), 355–367.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ohmae, K. (1990). The borderless world: Power and strategy in the interlinked economy. London: Harper Collins.

    Google Scholar 

  • Palmer, R. H., & Parsons, N. (1977). The roots of rural poverty in Central and Southern Africa. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pedro, A. M. A. (2006). Mainstreaming mineral wealth in growth and poverty reduction strategies. Minerals & Energy, 21(1), 2–16. doi:10.1080/14041040500504319.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pierson, P. (2000). The limits of design: Explaining institutional origins and change. Governance, 13(4), 475–499. doi:10.1111/0952-1895.00142.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Porter, T., & Ronit, K. (2006). Self-regulation as policy process: The multiple and criss-crossing stages of private rule-making. Policy Sciences, 39(1), 41–72. doi:10.1007/s11077-006-9008-5.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Porter, T., & Ronit, K. (Eds.) (2010). The challenges of global business authority: Democratic renewal, stalemate, or decay? Albany: SUNY Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Poteete, A. R. (2009). Is development path dependent or political? A reinterpretation of mineral-dependent development in Botswana. Journal of Development Studies, 45(4), 544–571. doi:10.1080/00220380802265488.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Prakash, A., & Potoski, M. (2006). Racing to the bottom? Trade, environmental governance, and ISO 14001. American Journal of Political Science, 50(2), 350–364. doi:10.2307/3694277.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ross, M. L. (1999). The political economy of the resource curse. World Politics, 51(2). doi:10.1017/S0043887100008200.

  • Ross, M. L. (2001a). Does Oil Hinder Democracy? World Politics, 53(3), 325–361. doi:10.1353/wp.2001.0011.

  • Ross, M. L. (2001b). Timber booms and institutional breakdown in Southeast Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Ross, M. L. (2003). The natural resource curse: How wealth can make you poor. In I. Bannon & P. Collier (Eds.), Natural resources and violent conflict: Options and actions (pp. 17–49). Washington, DC: World Bank.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross, M. L. (2004a). Does taxation lead to representation. British Journal of Political Science, 34(2), 229–249. doi: 10.1017/S0007123404000031.

  • Ross, M. L. (2004b). What do we know about natural resources and civil war? Journal of Peace Research, 41(3), 337–356.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross, M. L. (2008). Oil, Islam, and women. American Political Science Review, 102(1), 107. doi:10.1017/S0003055408080040.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rosser, A. (2006). The political economy of the resource curse: A literature survey. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (1995). Natural resource abundance and economic growth. Working Paper Series. Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research

    Google Scholar 

  • Sala-i-Martin, X., & Subramanian, A. (2003). Addressing the natural resource curse: An illustration from Nigeria. IMF Working Papers. International Monetary Fund.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schiavi, P., & Solomon, F. (2007). Voluntary initiatives in the mining industry: Do they work? Greener Management International, Spring 2006, 53, 27–41.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sethi, S. P., & Emelianova, O. (2006). A failed strategy of using voluntary codes of conduct by the global mining industry. Corporate Governance, 6(3), 226–238. doi:10.1108/14720700610671837.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shaxson, N. (2005). New approaches to volatilty: Dealing with the ‘resource curse’ in Sub-Saharan Africa. International Affairs, 81(2), 311–324. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2005.00452.x.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Singer, H. W. (1950). The distribution of gains between investing and borrowing countries. The American Economic Review, 40(2), 473–485.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sinha, S., & Lipton, M. (1999). Damaging fluctuations, risk and poverty: A review. background paper for the world development report 2001. Institute for Development Studies. Brighton, UK: World Bank.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stiglitz, J. E. (2007). Rich countries, poor people? New Perspectives Quarterly, 24(1), 7–9. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5842.2007.00856.x.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stoker, G., & Marsh, D. (2010). Introduction. In D. Marsh & G. Stoker (Eds.), Theory and methods in political science. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strange, S. (1996). The retreat of the state: The diffusion of power in the world economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Swank, D. (1998). Funding the welfare state: Globalization and the taxation of business in advanced market economies. Political Studies, 46(4), 671–692.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tornell, A., & Lane, P. R. (1999). The voracity effect. American Economic Review, 89(1), 22–46. doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Torvik, R. (2002). Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare. Journal of Development Economics, 67(2), 455–470. doi:10.1016/S0304-3878(01)00195-X.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • United Nations Development Bank. (2012). International Human Development Indicators. Retrieved May 13, 2012, from http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/tables/

  • Van der Ploeg, F., & Poelhekke, S. (2009). Volatility and the natural resource curse. Oxford Economic Papers, 61(4), 727–760. doi:10.1093/oep/gpp027.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vogel, D. (1995). Trading up: Consumer and environmental regulation in global economy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vogel, D. (2006a). The market for virtue: The potential and limits of corporate social responsibility. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wallerstein, I. M. (1984). The politics of the world-economy: The states, the movements, and the civilizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weiss, L. (2003). States in the global economy: Bringing domestic institutions back in. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Weisskoff, R., & Wolff, E. (1977). Linkages and leakages: Industrial tracking in an enclave economy. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 25(4), 607–628. doi:10.2307/1152963.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wick, K., & Bulte, E. (2009). The curse of natural resources. Annual Review of Resource Economics, 1(1), 139–156. doi:10.1146/annurev.resource.050708.144219.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • World Bank. (2015). World development indicators. Retrieved from http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Copyright information

© 2017 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Elbra, A. (2017). Theoretical Explanations for Firm-Led Governance. In: Governing African Gold Mining. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56354-5_2

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics