Ground Rules: Lessons from Wilson

  • Jonathan Schaffer
Chapter
Part of the New Directions in the Philosophy of Science book series (NDPS)

Abstract

Wilson’s “No Work for a Theory of Grounding” (2014) offers an insightful critique of grounding-based approaches to metaphysical inquiry. She argues that the notion of grounding is uninformative, disunified, and in the end unhelpful. I think that Wilson is right to criticize many extant grounding-based approaches for not being sufficiently informative, but reply that the grounding theorist can learn her lesson by using structural equation models, in ways that reveal the unity and informativeness of grounding. (I also argue that Wilson’s own alternative approach is open to serious criticisms, including every one of the criticisms she levels at the grounding theorist.)

Keywords

Structural Equation Model Ground Rule Primitive Notion Counterfactual Reasoning Metaphysical Explanation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jonathan Schaffer
    • 1
  1. 1.Rutgers UniversityNew BrunswickUSA

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