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Grounding in the Philosophy of Mind: A Defense

  • Alyssa Ney
Chapter
Part of the New Directions in the Philosophy of Science book series (NDPS)

Abstract

One of the main trends in metaphysics in recent years has been the development and defense of novel conceptual frameworks for representing facts about fundamentality. Of particular interest has been the concept of grounding. Often the introduction of these new concepts is motivated by the argument that other notions metaphysicians use in order to frame their positions are inadequate to the task of characterizing the important problems and views of metaphysics. These suggestions have been met with mixed reactions in philosophical circles. Some of those working on first-order metaphysical problems were quick to see the utility of these notions. However, in philosophy of mind, these proposals have been met with skepticism. A commonly voiced complaint is that these metaphysical concepts are philosophically superfluous; they add nothing to the concepts philosophers of mind have already had in their toolboxes for years. I will argue that by deploying the conceptual distinctions introduced by especially Fine, we are able to resolve debates that have been carrying on in the philosophy of mind for decades by formulating novel, clear, and conciliatory positions.

Keywords

Special Science Intrinsic Structure Withdrawal Behavior Attitude Ascription Ontological Dependence 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alyssa Ney
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of CaliforniaDavisUSA

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