Abstract
Does a member state’s administrative capacity explain varying level of control? In addition to studying the relationship between the frequency of signalling and a member state’s administrative capacity, this chapter also ascertains the explanatory power of administrative capacity in understanding the signalling strategies applied (bilateral or collective) as well as the stage in the negotiation at which such signalling occurs. Following a brief recapitulation of the main dependent and independent variable, this chapter introduces and tests three hypotheses through a series of bootstrapped regression models. The results provide support that administrative capacity is an important factor in explaining member-state behaviour in the Council.
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Notes
- 1.
The assumption that the speed of formulating a policy position is also translated into being relatively more active in the “proactive” than the “reactive” stages of the negotiation can be subject for debate. I do not see any reason why a member state would delay the signalling of a position once it has been formulated.
- 2.
This notwithstanding, post estimation of the models revealed that the null hypothesis of normally distributed error could not be rejected. Neither could we reject the hypothesis of homoscedastic errors.
- 3.
An alternative formulation of the model was also estimated using only monitoring capacity and CMB as independent variables. Regardless of the choice of dependent and independent variables, the CMB had no significant effect (while monitoring still had).
- 4.
Originally, a proper network analysis was aspired through a web survey throughout the national administrations. The level of detail in the data ultimately gathered differs significantly from the original aspirations, for both the involvement of other public actors and the intensity of the coordination system.
- 5.
The survey included the following question to measure the “demand for control”: “How often do you feel that the Commission’s initial proposals deviate from your country’s preferences?”
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Adriaensen, J. (2016). Administrative Capacity and Control. In: National Administrations in EU Trade Policy. European Administrative Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-54767-5_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-54767-5_7
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