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Administrative Capacity and Control

  • Johan Adriaensen
Chapter
Part of the European Administrative Governance book series (EAGOV)

Abstract

Does a member state’s administrative capacity explain varying level of control? In addition to studying the relationship between the frequency of signalling and a member state’s administrative capacity, this chapter also ascertains the explanatory power of administrative capacity in understanding the signalling strategies applied (bilateral or collective) as well as the stage in the negotiation at which such signalling occurs. Following a brief recapitulation of the main dependent and independent variable, this chapter introduces and tests three hypotheses through a series of bootstrapped regression models. The results provide support that administrative capacity is an important factor in explaining member-state behaviour in the Council.

Keywords

Member State Ordinary Little Square Signalling Strategy Negotiation Process Common Method Bias 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Johan Adriaensen
    • 1
  1. 1.Maastricht UniversityMaastrichtThe Netherlands

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