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Numerous Military Revolutions?

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The Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe

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Abstract

Over the course of history several instances of “revolutionary” military changes can be observed. Examples of this are the tactics of the Macedonian armies, the development of the trace italienne, the rise of pike and arquebus formations, and the technological developments of WWI. Under close examination, these apparent revolutionary transformations reveal themselves to be the product of evolutionary processes whose development accelerates or slows down in response to military needs. The numerous instances of this type of historical occurrence nullify the concept of a Military Revolution as a viable explanation to the developments of the Early Modern period.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Ibid., 85.

  2. 2.

    Volker Schmidtchen, Kriegswesen im späten Mittelalter (Weinheim, VCH Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990), 8.

  3. 3.

    Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (Neuenkirchen, RaBaKa Publishing, 2010), 179.

  4. 4.

    Herfried Münkler, Über den Krieg. Stationen der Kriegsgeschichte im Spiegel ihrer theoretischen Reflexion (Weilerswist, Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2002), 200.

  5. 5.

    Hans Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, 7 vols. (Berlin: Stilke, 1900–1936); Max Jähns, Handbuch einer Geschichte des Kriegswesens. Von der Uhrzeit bis zur Renaissance, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Verlag von Fr. Wilh. Grunow, 1878–1880); Charles Oman, A History of the Art of War. The Middle Ages from the Fourth to the Fourteenth Century (London: Methuen & Co., 1898).

  6. 6.

    For a detailed analysis of the importance of horses for Alexander’s strategies see the forthcoming article: Frank Jacob, “Der Aufstieg Makedoniens: Eine Erfolgsgeschichte antiker Kavallerie,” in Pferde in der Geschichte, ed. Frank Jacob (Darmstadt, Büchner, 2016).

  7. 7.

    Rogers, Military Revolutions, 244.

  8. 8.

    Ibid.

  9. 9.

    Ibid., 276.

  10. 10.

    Ibid., 277.

  11. 11.

    Parker, Rise of the West (1996), 8.

  12. 12.

    Clifford Rogers, “Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War,” in The Military Revolution Debate, Clifford Rogers (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 64–73.

  13. 13.

    Parker, Rise of the West (1996), 9–10.

  14. 14.

    Francesco Guicciardini, Storia d’Italia (Torino: Einaudi 1971), Libro Primo, XI.

  15. 15.

    Guicciardini is particularly impressed by the French artillery’s rate of fire. Ibid.

  16. 16.

    Parker, Rise of the West (1996), 8–9.

  17. 17.

    S. Lang, “Sforzinda, Filarete and Filelfo”, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 35, (1972), 391–397.

  18. 18.

    E. M. Merrill, “The Trattato as Textbook: Francesco di Giorgio’s Vision for the Renaissance Architect,” Architectural Histories 1:1 (2013), 20, doi:10.5334/ah.at.

  19. 19.

    John R. Hale, Renaissance War Studies (London: The Hambledon Press, 1983), 17.

  20. 20.

    Ibid., 8.

  21. 21.

    Ibid., 23.

  22. 22.

    Ibid., 28.

  23. 23.

    Niccolo Machiavelli, Dell’arte della Guerra, in Machiavelli, The Chief Works and Others, Vol. II, trans. by A. Gilbert (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 1989), 703–708.

  24. 24.

    Ibid.

  25. 25.

    Niccolo Machiavelli, An Account of a Visit Made to Fortify Florence: A Letter to the Ambassador of the Republic in Rome, in Machiavelli, The Chief Works and Others, Vol. II, trans. by A. Gilbert (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 1989), 727–734.

  26. 26.

    Simon Pepper, “Planning versus Fortification: Sangallo’s project for the defense of Rome,” Fort 2 (1976), 33–49.

  27. 27.

    Georg Agricola, Zwölf Bücher vom Berg- und Hüttenwesen (Berlin, VDI-Verlag, 1928), 8.

  28. 28.

    David Parrot, “The Utility of Fortifications in Early Modern Europe: Italian Princes and their Citadels, 1540-1640,” War in History 7:2 (2000), 132.

  29. 29.

    Ibid.

  30. 30.

    Kingra, Trace Italienne, 438.

  31. 31.

    Ibid., 439.

  32. 32.

    In the case of the battles of the Franco-Flemish War, it is evident that the Flemish infantry formations had a limited effectiveness. During the battles of Courtrai and Arques, the Flemish infantry, armed with goedendag and pikes, was successful in a defensive position; the French cavalry was decimated as they relentlessly tried to break the Flemish formation. However, at the battle of Mons-en-Pévèle the Flemings were defeated as they abandoned their hitherto successful defensive position and launched an attack on the French camp. Kelly DeVries, Infantry Warfare in the Fourteenth Century: Discipline, Tactics and Technology (Suffolk, UK: Boydell & Brewer Ltd, 1996), 9–48.

  33. 33.

    Clive Church and Randolph Head, A Concise History of Switzerland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 18.

  34. 34.

    Ibid., 23.

  35. 35.

    Ibid., 188.

  36. 36.

    DeVries, Infantry Warfare, 129.

  37. 37.

    Ibid., 134.

  38. 38.

    Oman, Art of War, 77–79.

  39. 39.

    Ibid., 78.

  40. 40.

    Douglas Miller and Gerry Embleton, The Swiss at War, 1300-1500 (Oxford: Osprey, 1979), 10.

  41. 41.

    Oman, Art of War, 79–80.

  42. 42.

    Niccolo Machiavelli, The Art of War in Machiavelli in The Chief Works and Others, Vol. II, trans. by A. Gilbert (Duke University Press: Durham and London, 1989), 599–600.

  43. 43.

    Oman, Art of War, 80.

  44. 44.

    Miller, Swiss, 20–24.

  45. 45.

    Oman, Art of War, 83.

  46. 46.

    Ibid.

  47. 47.

    Ibid., 84–86 and Miller, Swiss, 26–28.

  48. 48.

    Oman, Art of War, 86–87.

  49. 49.

    Machiavelli, Art of War, 597.

  50. 50.

    This was the weak point of the Swiss armies. The number of arquebuses within their ranks was comparatively small. At the battle of Marignano, for example, only about 5 % of the combatants had firearms. N. Le Roux, 1515, L’Invention de la Renaissance (Paris: Armand Colin, 2015), ch. 8.

  51. 51.

    Ibid., 628–629.

  52. 52.

    Julius Norwich, A History of Venice (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), 428.

  53. 53.

    M. Mallet and C. Shaw, The Italian Wars, 1494-1559 (Harlow, UK: Pearson, 2012), 121.

  54. 54.

    Ibid., 122.

  55. 55.

    Oman, Art of War, 89–90.

  56. 56.

    Victor G. Kiernan, “Mercenaries and Absolute Monarchy,” Past and Present 11 (1957), 66–86.

  57. 57.

    The first contingents of Landsknechts were created by Emperor Maximilian in the late fifteenth century. Oman, Art of War, 89.

  58. 58.

    Guicciardini records that prior to the battle of Marignano the bishop of Sion gave an impassioned speech to the Confederates in which he reminded them of how they crushed the French at Novara, even though they lacked cavalry and artillery. Based on their consistent record, the Swiss had a good reason to think that should be victorious at Marignano. Guicciardini, Storia d’Italia, Libro XII, XV.

  59. 59.

    Ibid.

  60. 60.

    The French king also reorganized his infantry into smaller formations and the cavalry into squadrons. Ibid.

  61. 61.

    Ibid.

  62. 62.

    Mallet, Italian Wars, 130.

  63. 63.

    Le Roux, L’Invention, ch. 8.

  64. 64.

    Ibid.

  65. 65.

    Guicciardini, Storia d’Italia, XII, XV.

  66. 66.

    While Marignano was a devastating defeat for the Swiss, Guicciardini writes that they were able to retire from the field in good order and even carried with them the French guns that they captured in the initial charge. Ibid.

  67. 67.

    Machiavelli attributes the Swiss method of fighting to their poverty (and therefore their inability to raise an army of horses) and their desire to live free. Machiavelli sees the Swiss tactics as a revival of ancient practices, but there is no evidence that the Swiss used classical historical or literary sources as a reference for their fighting methods. Machiavelli, Prince, II, 597.

  68. 68.

    One of the most remarkable actions of the Catalan Company during their eastern campaigns was the battle of Cephissus in 1311, when the Iberians defeated the Duchy of Athens. This was one of those unusual medieval battles in which infantry defeated an army heavily composed of cavalry. The victory of the Almogavars was overwhelming; according to Francisco de Moncada, out of 700 knights in the Frankish army only two survived. Francisco de Moncada, Expedicion de los Catalanes y Aragoneses contra Turcos y Griegos, LXV (Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes, http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra-visor-din/expedicion-de-los-catalanes-y-aragoneses-contra-turcos-y-griegos--0/html).

  69. 69.

    Miguel Ladero Quesada, Castilla y la Conquista del Reino de Granada (Granada: Diputación Provincial de Granada, 1993), 35.

  70. 70.

    Alfonso de Palencia provides a detailed account of these actions. In 1489, for example, a squad of 250 horsemen (presumably knights) and 500 foot-soldiers marched deep into the territory of Guadix using difficult mountain paths in order to conduct a raid against Muslim villages and towns. During this action the Christian force killed 300 Moors and brought back several herds of sheep. This type of operation would be an important part of the Spanish campaign in the Kingdom of Naples during the 1490s. Alfonso de Palencia Guerra de Granada, Libro IX (http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra-visor-din/guerra-de-granada--0/html/feea932c-82b1-11df-acc7-002185ce6064_5.html).

  71. 71.

    Ibid., 33.

  72. 72.

    Ibid.

  73. 73.

    Nancy Rubin, Isabella of Castile: The First Renaissance Queen (Lincoln, NE: ASJA Press, 1991), 221.

  74. 74.

    Ladero Quesada, Castilla, 189.

  75. 75.

    Ibid., 183.

  76. 76.

    Rene Quatrefages, “La Organización Militar de los Siglos XV y XVI,” Actas de las II Jornadas Nacionales de Historia Militar (Málaga: Universidad de Cádiz, 1993), 14–16.

  77. 77.

    Rene Quatrefages, “Genesis de la Historia Militar de España,” Militaria, Revista de Cultura Militar 7 (1995), 61.

  78. 78.

    Quatrefages, La Organización Militar de los Siglos XV y XVI, 14.

  79. 79.

    Ibid.

  80. 80.

    The guard consisted of 2500 men-at-arms, probably in imitation of the accomplished French gendarmes. Quatrefages, Génesis, 62.

  81. 81.

    The idea of a permanent Spanish army first emerged in 1476 when the Catholic Monarchs established the Santa Hermandad with the purpose of maintaining public order within the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon. Miguel Ladero Quesada, Ejércitos y Armadas de los Reyes Católicos, Nápoles y El Rosellón (1494-1504) (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 2010), 164.

  82. 82.

    Ibid., 63.

  83. 83.

    Ibid., 64.

  84. 84.

    Ibid., 221–222.

  85. 85.

    Quatrefages, Génesis, 64.

  86. 86.

    The espingarda was a hand-held firearm that was the precursor to the arquebus. Ibid.

  87. 87.

    Jerónimo Zurita, Historia del Rey Don Hernando el Cathólico, de las Empresas y Ligas de Italia, Libro V, XXVII (http://web.archive.org/web/20071209121554/http://www.dpz.es/ifc2/libros/2584/ebook2584.asp). Other chronicles provide slightly larger number for the Spanish forces and exaggerated numbers for the French; however, they coincide on the number of Landsknechts and Swiss pikemen.

  88. 88.

    A general outline of the battle can be reconstructed from similar accounts in several sixteenth-century chronicles. See Chrónica General del Gran Capitán Libro II, LXXVI, 161; Crónica Manuscrita Libro VI, XVI, 367; and Paolo Giovio La Vida y Chrónica de Gonzalo Hernández de Córdoba llamdo por sobrenombre El Gran Capitán, Libro II, 519-520 in Crónicas del Gran Capitán, ed. A. Rodriguez Villa (Madrid: Librería Editorial de Bailly/Bailliere, 1903).

  89. 89.

    Ibid.

  90. 90.

    Ibid.

  91. 91.

    Giovio, Vida, Libro II, 520.

  92. 92.

    It should be noted that artillery did not play an important role in the battle. The French cannon where emplaced in a position where they could not do damage to the Spanish forces, and the Spanish artillery suffered an unfortunate accident that blew up all the ammunition and gunpowder available to them, prompting The Great Captain utter his famous phrase: “I have seen the luminaries of victory.” Giovio, Vida, Libro II, 520.

  93. 93.

    Ladero Quesada, Ejércitos, 274.

  94. 94.

    Chrónica General del Gran Capitán, Libro II, XCIX, 196–199.

  95. 95.

    Serafin María de Sotto, Conde de Clonard, Historia Orgánica de Infantería y Caballería Españolas (Madrid: Castillo, 1851), 408.

  96. 96.

    Gonzalo de Ayora was a Spanish commander and official chronicler of the kingdom present during the Rousillon campaign. His letters to the king and other royal officials provide a detailed view of the operations in this theater of the war against France and his ideas regarding military reform. See: Gonzalo de Ayora, Cartas de Gonzalo de Ayora, Cronista de los Reyes Católicos (Madrid: Imprenta Sancha, 1794).

  97. 97.

    Zurita, Libro V, LVII.

  98. 98.

    Chrónica General del Gran Capitán, CIII-CX, 208–219.

  99. 99.

    Ibid., CX.

  100. 100.

    De Soto, 394.

  101. 101.

    Ibid., 411.

  102. 102.

    De Soto points out that this reorganization of tactical units coincided with the arrival in Spain of 3000 Landsknechte accompanying the new rulers of Castile, Juana and Phillip the Handsome. Ibid., 413.

  103. 103.

    Francisco Arias Marco, “Aclaraciones en torno a las coronelías y los tercios” in Actas de las II Jornadas Nacionales de Historia Militar (Málaga: Universidad de Cádiz, 1993), 218.

  104. 104.

    Two of the companies were composed exclusively of select pikemen. Ibid.

  105. 105.

    The term “tercio” is officially established only in 1536 in the Ordenanzas the Genova.

  106. 106.

    Arias, Aclaraciones, 219.

  107. 107.

    Sancho de Londoño, Discurso sobre la forma de reducir la Disciplina Militar a mejor y antiguo estado, 1589 (http://www.vallenajerilla.com/berceo/antoninoperez/reducirdisciplinalondono.htm).

  108. 108.

    Diego de Salazar, Tratado De Re Militari (Brussels: Roger Velpius, 1590).

  109. 109.

    Saul Martínez Bermejo, “Antigua disciplina: el ejemplo romano en los tratados militares ibéricos, c. 1560-1600,” Hispania, Revista Española de Historia 74:247 (2014).

  110. 110.

    See the report on a recent conference on the interrelationship of technology and warfare at the University of Würzburg (Germany), which is available at the following URL: http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/tagungsberichte/id=5466 (last access, October 31, 2014).

  111. 111.

    Waldemar Kaempffert, “War and Technology,” American Journal of Sociology 46:4 (1941), 432.

  112. 112.

    Ibid., 442.

  113. 113.

    Ibid., 443.

  114. 114.

    Carl von Clausewitz, On War, vol. 1 (London: Kegan Paul, 1908), 119.

  115. 115.

    Sakurai Tadayoshi, Human Bullets. A Soldier’s Story of Port Arthur (Boston/New York, Houghton, Mifflin & Company, 1907), 149.

  116. 116.

    Ibid., 152.

  117. 117.

    Ibid., 153.

  118. 118.

    Andrew N. Liaropoulos, “Revolutions in Warfare: Theoretical Paradigms and Historical Evidence: The Napoleonic and First World War Revolutions in Military Affairs,” The Journal of Military History 70:2 (2006), 365.

  119. 119.

    Ibid., 382.

  120. 120.

    Creveld, Gesichter, 84.

  121. 121.

    Army War College ed., Machine Gun Notes, No. 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917), 5.

  122. 122.

    U.S. Ordnance Department, ed., Handbook of the Maxim Automatic Machine Gun, Caliber 30, Model of 1904 with Pack Outfits and Accessories (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917), 7.

  123. 123.

    Ibid., 93–97; Metz, Ursprünge der Zukunft, 421–427.

  124. 124.

    Ibid., 419.

  125. 125.

    Manuel Köppen, Das Entsetzen des Beobachters. Krieg und Medien im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 2005), 1; Dierk Spreen, Tausch, Technik, Krieg. Die Geburt der Gesellschaft im technisch-medialen Apriori (Berlin et al.: Argument Verlag, 1998), 11; Horst Tonn, “Medialisierung von Kriegserfahrungen,” in Kriegserfahrungen – Krieg und Gesellschaft in der Neuzeit. Neue Horizonte der Forschung, eds. G. Schild and A. Schindling (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2009), 109–133, here 110.

  126. 126.

    Ivan Bloch, Is War Now Impossible? Being an Abridgment of the War of the Future in Its Technical, Economic, and Political Relations (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger, 2008 [originally published 1899]).

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    Frank Jacob & Gilmar Visoni-Alonzo

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Jacob, F., Visoni-Alonzo, G. (2016). Numerous Military Revolutions?. In: The Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe. Palgrave Pivot, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53918-2_3

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