Is There Room for Nonconceptual Content in Kant’s Critical Philosophy?
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By examining relevant texts and considering the systematic coherence of Kant’s position, this paper asks whether there is a place for nonconceptual content in his Critical philosophy. Starting with representations with conceptual content, Onof successively examines (i) whether there is more to representations whose conceptual content is well established than is captured by means of concepts, and (ii) the possibility of representations with merely nonconceptual content. With these questions answered in the affirmative, Onof addresses the issue of the dependence of representations with merely nonconceptual content upon those with conceptual content, and thereby distances himself from standard nonconceptualist views. He concludes with some general considerations about the functions of the limited notion of nonconceptual content that the paper identifies.
KeywordsPerceptual Experience Conceptual Content Objective Ground Partial Representation Clear Concept
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