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Getting Acquainted with Kant

  • Colin McLearEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

A central question for Kant scholars concerns whether Kant thinks that experience has nonconceptual content, or whether, on his view, experience is essentially conceptual. McLear argues that in a certain sense this question is ill-conceived. He presents an alternative means of framing what is at issue in terms of a debate about the dependence relations, if any, that exist between different cognitive capacities. We should distinguish between Intellectualism, according to which all objective representation (understood in a particular way) depends on acts of synthesis by the intellect, and Sensibilism, according to which at least some forms of objective representatin are independent of any such acts (or the capacity for such acts). McLear also articulates a challenge to Intellectualist interpretations based on the role that Kant indicates alethic modal conditions play in achieving cognition.

Keywords

Correctness Condition Real Possibility Epistemic Attitude Conceptual Content Conceptualism Debate 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Nebraska-LincolnLincolnUSA

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