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Moderate Conceptualism and Spatial Representation

  • Thomas LandEmail author
Chapter
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Abstract

Thomas Land argues that Kant’s theory of spatial representation supports a moderately conceptualist view of his theory of intuition. In making the case for this he focuses on three aspects of he theory of spatial representation: the distinction Kant draws between the original representation of space and the representations of determinate spaces, the doctrine of the productive imagination and the doctrine of the a priori determination of sensibility by the understanding. He explains why these three aspects support a moderately conceptualist view and considers a number of objections.

Keywords

Spatial Representation Moderate Conceptualism Homogeneous Manifold Holistic Character Productive Imagination 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyRyerson UniversityTorontoCanada

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