Directions in Space, Nonconceptual Form and the Foundations of Transcendental Idealism

  • Robert HannaEmail author


The central aim of this chapter is to demonstrate an essential connection between Kant’s nonconceptualism and his transcendental idealism by tracing this line of thinking in Kant’s work directly back to his pre-Critical essay of 1768, Concerning the Ground of the Ultimate Differentiation of Directions in Space aka “Directions in Space”. What I shall argue is that Kant’s nonconceptualism about the human mind goes all the way down into his metaphysics; that the apparent world fundamentally conforms to human sensibility even if it does not fundamentally conform to the human understanding; and that the basic source of all this is Kant’s (pre-Critical but later also Critical) theory of space and how we represent it.


Human Mind Representational Content Human Understanding Human Sensibility Phenomenal World 
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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Independent ScholarOxfordUSA

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