On the Relation of Intuition to Cognition

  • Anil GomesEmail author
  • Andrew Stephenson


Recent debates in the interpretation of Kant’s theoretical philosophy have focused on the nature of Kantian intuition and, in particular, on the question of whether intuitions depend for their existence on the existence of their objects. In this chapter, Gomes and Stephenson show how opposing answers to this question determine different accounts of the nature of Kantian cognition. They suggest that progress can be made on determining the nature of intuition by considering the implications different views have for the nature of cognition. Topics of discussion are the relation of cognition to our contemporary conception of knowledge, the role of real possibility and Kant’s modal condition on cognition and the structure and purpose of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.


Actual Object Real Possibility Representational Content Justify True Belief Objective Validity 
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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyOxford UniversityOxfordUK
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyHumboldt UniversityBerlinGermany

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