Why the Transcendental Deduction is Compatible with Nonconceptualism

  • Sacha GolobEmail author


One of the strongest motivations for conceptualist readings of Kant is the belief that the Transcendental Deduction is incompatible with nonconceptualism. In this chapter, Golob argues that this belief is simply false: the Deduction and nonconceptualism are compatible at both an exegetical and a philosophical level. Placing particular emphasis on the case of non-human animals, Golob discusses in detail how and why his reading diverges from those of Ginsborg, Allais, Gomes and others. He suggests that ultimately it is only by embracing nonconceptualism that we can fully recognise the delicate calibration of the trap which the Critique sets for Hume.


Standard View Phenomenal World Empirical Concept Transcendental Idealism Transcendental Argument 
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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyKing’s College LondonLondonUK

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