Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism in Kant: A Survey of the Recent Debate

  • Lucy AllaisEmail author


As one of the main proponents of Kantian nonconceptualism, Lucy Allais provides a helpful overview of the current debate on nonconceptualism in Kant scholarship by drawing on those papers that represent what appear to be central argumentative possibilities. She also responds to certain objections from conceptualists, and in specific respects makes concessions to the conceptualist, whilst holding on to her original claim that Kant is committed to a kind of nonconceptualism and that a nonconceptualist reading of intuition must be our starting point in approaching central arguments such as in the Transcendental Deduction. She emphasises that her modestly nonconceptualist interpretation is entirely compatible with thinking that all intuitions are conceptualised, that conceptualisation radically transforms what is given in intuition and for what is given in intuition to play a role in cognition, intuitions must be conceptualised.


Representational Content Mental Content Contemporary Debate Perceptual Content Conceptualist Argument 
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© The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyWits UniversityGautengSouth Africa
  2. 2.Department of Philosophy, University of California San DiegoSan DiegoUSA

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