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Neurotechnologies of the Self pp 77–107Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Taking Care of One’s Brain

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Abstract

One page of my qEEG (Used with permission of Roland Verment)

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Notes

  1. 1.

    People who want to change themselves can use techniques that change their selves: the difference between changing themselves (feeling better) and changing their selves (subjectivity, identity) is confusing but will become clear in the course of this book.

  2. 2.

    With ‘non-modern’ Pickering refers to Latour (1993) who states that non-moderns do not make a clear distinction between subjects and objects, while modern people do.

  3. 3.

    Both principles are from antiquity, but according to Foucault the meaning of ‘know yourself’ changed and became more important during Christianity (Foucault, 1984, 1988).

  4. 4.

    Besides verbalization the human sciences make use of various other techniques such as diagnostic handbooks, statistics, and non-verbal therapies (see, for example, Rose, 1998).

  5. 5.

    Some users mentioned different problems like tinnitus, anorexia, motor disabilities, or problems due to a stroke. See Appendix 1.

  6. 6.

    Example translated from www.neurobics.nl/cli-ntenervaringen-depressie/ (accessed on 15-11-2012).

  7. 7.

    Announcement for (Mieras, 2004), accessed in June 2009; www.neurocare.nl/nl/node/96

  8. 8.

    When explaining his own training process, however, this practitioner attributes himself a more active role: ‘I controlled the dominant frequencies in that area. Or, I imagined I would and gave my brain the assignment to manage this and to make sure that I didn’t need to pay attention anymore’ (7).

  9. 9.

    Although neurofeedback is a brain training, and performed by the mind, the body is also important. Users’ bodies become literally fixated with electrodes that also register their muscle movement. This can make them very aware of their body. See my own experience in the introduction of this chapter, and my explanations of neurofeedback as a dance of agency in Chap. 6.

  10. 10.

    My own experiences in feeling somewhat endangered in my sense of self, due to my confrontation with my brain, emphasizes this idea.

  11. 11.

    That is, for those users who are aware of what they are doing. Some people (and probably most children) keep it really simple and state that they are only watching a movie.

  12. 12.

    Translated from www.neurobics.nl/cli-ntenervaringen-stress/ (accessed on 9-Mar-2012).

  13. 13.

    Translated from www.neurobics.nl/cli-ntenervaringen-stress/ (accessed on 9-3-2012).

  14. 14.

    Another practitioner who cannot help himself with neurofeedback explains this with ‘I am a man; I am not so aware of my body.’

  15. 15.

    One practitioner has a room in which four family members (or other relatives) can train together.

  16. 16.

    See, for example, www.neurofeedbackholiday.com/ (accessed on 15-11-2012).

  17. 17.

    According to Hacking, ‘neuroscientists like Damasio’ have created a threesome. That is, this neurologically nested triad idea is not Hacking’s view, but Damasio’s view according to Hacking. Hence, my rejection of the triad should not be interpreted as a critique of Hacking, but as an extension of his critique of Damasio’s ideas.

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  1. University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

    Jonna Brenninkmeijer

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Brenninkmeijer, J. (2016). Taking Care of One’s Brain. In: Neurotechnologies of the Self. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53386-9_4

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