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Pearcey draws on a discursive interpretation of European civilization to reflect critically on disciplinary origin stories, especially that of the ‘orthodox’ English School. Inspired by a wave of more ‘critical’ English School scholarship, Pearcey outlines the purpose of his study, to detail a simultaneous process of exclusion and inclusion in the historical and contemporary relations between indigenous peoples and international society.
KeywordsInternational Society Indigenous People International Relation Sovereign State English School
The concept of civilization is deceptively complex. While we use it in our everyday lives without much hesitation, the fact remains that it has long been employed as a discursive tool to delineate an inside from an outside, that is, between the civilized and uncivilized worlds. Whether it came in the form of white man’s burden, the mission civilisatrice, or manifest destiny, discourses on civilization have played a central role in defining the boundaries between Self and Other. For others, civilization refers more specifically to a cultural entity. Perhaps the best example of this is Samuel P. Huntington’s now famous thesis, outlined in “The Clash of Civilizations?” which was premised on the idea that civilizations, plural, would define the trajectory of conflict in the post–Cold War era along cultural lines—a departure from the more ideological and economic lines of conflict that characterized decades past. For Huntington, a civilization “is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people.” 1 Huntington further nuanced his definition by noting “levels of identity” within civilizations, as well as the associated challenge of neatly demarcating one civilization from another. 2 And, on that basis, he proceeded to describe a state of affairs in which the Western world would have to contest with a number of rising civilizations in the post–Cold War period, in particular, “several Islamic-Confucian states.” 3 As others have argued, however, that line of argumentation could be perceived as perpetuating an imperial discourse on civilization, rooted in problematic assumptions about Western civilization, and the uncivilized peoples beyond it. Citing Huntington’s wider body of work, for example, Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney suggest that his is an approach that results in an inversion of violence; specifically, “the violence of international relations against an external other is simultaneously turned inward against the ungovernable other within.” 4 Speaking to the Self’s relationship to the “other within,” Inayatullah and Blaney’s point raises interesting questions about the way civilization is defined and deployed in international relations, as well as its consequences for theory and practice (not least, their concern with the discipline’s sidestepping of cultural difference). In the context of this book, for example, it provokes thought on the relationship between inclusion and exclusion, and how inclusions and exclusions have been manifested through a European discourse on civilization. Answers to these sorts of questions, however, are something of a moving target, as the historical meaning of civilization has varied from one society to the next. For example, the Chinese, Greeks, and Ottomans all adopted discourses on civilization that varied in their specific content: the Chinese with their Emperor, the Greeks with their “language and culture,” and the Ottomans with Islam. 5 But with that said, the discursive purposes of civilization have operated in a fairly consistent way across those that employ it as a discourse, that is, as a structuring device that can subsume and exclude the Other by way of its inclusion within the Self. 6
From a disciplinary point of view, it is disappointing to find that this function of civilization is largely missing from mainstream international relations theories. Where the English School is concerned, for example, it has traditionally fixed its focus on the specific content of a European discourse on civilization in defining membership in the society of states through a standard of civilization. That is in large part due to the fact that the orthodox account of international society’s evolution and expansion frames it as one of inclusion; in particular, a story that involves the expansion and transformation of a once European international society into a global one, culminating with the rapid entry of non-Western states in the mid-twentieth century with their adoption of European institutions (of note, my usage of the term ‘orthodox’ echoes others who have described a similar expansion story within the English School, such as Buzan and Little, and Carsten-Andreas Schulz, the latter who also refers to an “orthodox account” epitomized by The Expansion of International Society). 7 What that story misses is the more complicated interrelationship between inclusion and exclusion. Despite his critical view of the legal standard of civilization, for example, Gerrit W. Gong’s skillful analysis was fundamentally concerned with the role of the standard of civilization in defining membership in the society of states. What is not sufficiently addressed is how the gradual inclusion of non-Western countries foreclosed the possibility of them exercising alternative forms of sociopolitical existence. That is not to say that Gong’s analysis ignored the exclusionary dimensions of the standard of civilization—far from it—his analysis is deeply concerned with the cultural hierarchies implicit in the standard of civilization’s content (such as the role of the standard in eroding the sovereignty of non-Western societies until their inclusion within the society of states). But, the exclusionary aspects of the standard of civilization did not end with the entry of non-Western countries into the society of states; rather, it facilitated and institutionalized the exclusion of non-Western forms of sociopolitical organization from international society.
In effect, the evolution and expansion of international society enabled a process of ‘exclusion by inclusion.’ Although this turn of phrase is not often used in the international relations literature, the idea itself is not new, as a critical body of literature has increasingly concerned itself with the complex relationship between insider and outsider relations (including the exclusionary dynamics of inclusion). 8 Building on this body of literature, the central claim in this book is that the story of international society was underwritten by a European discourse on civilization that subsumed indigenous peoples within its expanding boundaries, resulting in the exclusion of indigenous peoples from the ‘international.’
That history of the colonial encounter—including the subsequent evolution of indigenous-state relations—provokes important questions about issues at the cutting edge of English School theory, such as the relationship between international and world society (broadly understood here as the relationship between state and non-state societies in the global space, and discussed in Chap. 2), and the colonial history of the former’s evolution and expansion. With a view to generating new insights and fresh thinking on those issues, I ask two interrelated and primary research questions: How did European colonialism and imperialism shape contemporary relations between state and non-state societies, in particular, those between states and indigenous peoples? 9 And, what does that tell us about the theory and practice of international relations? While a wave of critical and second-generation English School scholarship has begun to make important headway on these matters, I begin from the premise that the English School has much more to say on the evolution and expansion of international society, especially from a critical perspective. As such, I place the English School in dialogue with postcolonial theory in a way that conceptualizes their core concepts, themes, and interests (especially on the subject of international society’s evolution and expansion), as complementary elements in the telling of what Gurminder K. Bhambra and Sanjay Subrahmanyam have respectively referred to as a “connected history.” 10
Through that dialogue, I undertake a critical analysis of the evolution and expansion of international society, with a specific focus on the evolution of relations between states and indigenous peoples from the time of the Spanish conquest to the present. A key moment in world history, the arrival of the Spanish in the Americas laid the foundations for the inception of modern international law and was premised on the question of legal relations between two fundamentally unlike societies, the Amerindians and the Spanish; as Antony Anghie has persuasively argued, subsequent stages of international law—as well as the institution of sovereignty—evolved from these origins and perpetuated colonial structures. 11 How these stages have influenced the contemporary relations between indigenous peoples and international society from an English School perspective has, in my view, yet to be comprehensively explored (although an important exception is Paul Keal’s European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples). As such, the book proceeds with an examination of the legacies of that history for the relations between indigenous peoples and international society today to generate insights into the colonial and imperial constitution of institutions that govern those relations, and the wider social content of the global space. With a view to ‘setting the table’ for this line of argumentation, this chapter proceeds through four sections. First, I explain how this book conceptualizes civilization, with a specific focus on the content of a European discourse on civilization. Second, I reflect critically on the orthodox English School’s account of the evolution and expansion of international society, as epitomized by the joint works of Hedley Bull and Adam Watson. Third, I describe the book’s empirical focus and historical timeline, that is, the historical relations between indigenous peoples and international society from the time of the Spanish conquest to the present. Fourth, the chapter concludes by sketching out its main line of argumentation and provides short chapter summaries to help guide the reader.
In this book, my discussion of civilization is almost exclusively targeted at a European discourse on civilization that evolved over the course of Europe’s colonial and later imperial expansion. Despite a retreat from the more overt racial assumptions that were once characteristic of this discourse, its lingering assumptions about Self and Other are perpetuated through Eurocentric discourses on the theory and practice of international relations today. 12 With that in mind, defining civilization with any specific set of criteria is difficult, even if the scope is narrowed to a European discourse. For example, while it is true that a European discourse on civilization gradually came to associate itself with the sovereign state in the nineteenth century, its origins in like-terms suggest something rather different. Citing the work of Norbert Elias, Andrew Phillips reminds us that early European conceptualizations of civility were closely associated with “discipline and self-restraint.” 13 And, it was this meaning that was associated with the term civilisation, in 1756, by the elder Mirabeau (Victor de Riqueti); who, in the words of Phillips, “understood civilisation to refer […] to a refinement of popular manners and internal moral sensibilities,” but “also […] to the regulation of public violence.” 14 The inscription of civility (and later civilization) with self-restraint draws attention to the fact that discourses on civilization evolve over time and have been employed for both more progressive and violent purposes. Though I do not want to diminish the variety of ways that discourses on civilization have been used, I do want to draw attention to a European discourse’s specific role in the colonial and imperial constitution of Self–Other identities, as well as the implications this has had for the theory and practice of international relations. That is because it is this aspect of a European discourse on civilization that I understand to have featured most prominently in the evolution and expansion of international society—at least in the context of colonial and imperial relations between European and non-European societies.
These “bookends” should not imply an escape from the more specific content of a European discourse on civilization, however. Although the substantive meaning of a European discourse on civilization has varied, it is only by better understanding its constitution that a basis is established to critically engage with the ways it stratified the global space. In this respect, Brett Bowden has usefully drawn attention to both an “idea” and “ideal of civilization”; “the idea of civilization as both a process and a destination or state of being; […] the ideal of civilization as a comparative benchmark that manifests itself in a ‘standard of civilization.’” 17 Bowden’s distinction is important to this book for two interrelated reasons. First, it is important for the way it draws our attention to the sociopolitical character of a European discourse on civilization (discussed in a moment). Second, it is important because it sheds light on the teleological function of a European discourse on civilization in promoting universal visions of progress. 18 Moreover, these insights can be neatly situated within the “bookends” identified by Duara and used to detail the function of a European discourse on civilization in facilitating the processes of ‘exclusion by inclusion.’
Most of these uses have shared an understanding of ‘civilization’ as a way of identifying and ordering value in the world. The identification of value, however, sometimes implies the identification of a community of value, and civilization can also become the means of marking the Self from the Other. […] However, what distinguishes the civilizational idea from nationalism is its appeal to a higher, transcendent source of value and authority, capable of encompassing the Other [italics in the original]. 16
Indeed, these insights speak to the role of a European discourse on civilization in hierarchically stratifying the global space along the lines of a totalizing vision of European sociopolitical advancement. Despite being first documented in French as a legal term in 1743 (as civilisation), 19 civilization quickly adopted a normative association that distinguished savage and barbarian peoples from civilized, predominantly European, societies (these European societies viewing themselves as exhibiting higher levels of social, political, and legal order). And, critically, this distinction was intimately connected to the constitution of a European Self in juxtaposition with non-European Others. Inayatullah and Blaney, for example, describe the concept of ‘wildness’ in European-Christian thought, and its function in defining the relations between Europeans and the peoples of the Americas during the colonial encounter (as well as the lingering implications of that for the theory and practice of international relations today). 20 Thus, with the purported benefits of spreading civilization to uncivilized peoples in the non-European world, Europeans could feel justified in their colonial and imperial expansion as a type of civilizing mission. Of course, the specific ways by which civilization was ‘exported’ to non-Europeans by Europeans varied according to time and place; but as is discussed in this book, the exportation of civilization was driven largely by the colonial and imperial expansion of Europe over the course of several centuries. 21 Until about the late eighteenth century, much of this was achieved through colonial enterprises. That is, European empires asserted control over overseas territories, with European officials taking on the main roles of governance (in effect, what Jürgen Osterhammel calls formal empire). 22 In the late eighteenth century, Western empires came to rely less on such direct forms of control, instead, oscillating between direct and indirect means of influence over ‘their’ territories; affording them a partial degree of autonomy provided that their imperial interests were secure (in effect, what Osterhammel calls informal empire). 23 Irrespective of the type of colonial or imperial activity involved, however, what remained fairly consistent was the role of a European discourse on civilization in subsuming uncivilized others within Europe’s expanding boundaries—if not with explicit reference to the term ‘civilization,’ then in much the same way as Duara describes civilization’s “bookends” (as is discussed in Chap. 3, for example, Anghie, Bowden, and others have noted that Spanish colonialism relied on a discourse on civilization to substantiate its assertion of sovereignty over the Amerindians in the ‘New World,’ well before the term civilisation was articulated in the eighteenth century). 24
Indeed, it was not until the nineteenth century that civilization’s association with the sovereign state would crystalize, as evidenced by the appearance of the standard of civilization in the latter decades of that century. 25 The nineteenth century is thus a critical moment in the evolution of a European discourse on civilization, marking the moment that the intersection between territorial sovereignty and civilization was made explicit. Consider here, for example, the role of Western academic disciplines during this period in popularizing the idea of civilizational stages of advancement and their implications for international practice. Through a distinction between savage, barbarian, and civilized, Western academics and legalists advanced an outlook of the non-European world that warranted European intervention in the lives of uncivilized peoples. 26 Indeed, savagery did not necessarily imply an inability on the part of savages and barbarians to become civilized; rather, what was required was a form of European paternal guardianship to lead their way to civilization. That is not to say that all Westerners felt the same way; some certainly believed that savages were forever savage, while others were much more progressive in relation to their peers. But, the history of Western imperialism from at least the early-nineteenth century on is suggestive of a general tendency on the part of Western powers—and individuals for that matter—to understand their expansion as a form of civilizing mission. For example, David Long draws our attention to J.A. Hobson, a noted critique of imperialism who was quite ready to accept imperialism in the form of a paternal guardianship. Oscillating between internationalism and imperialism, Hobson agreed that “civilized Governments” could exercise authority over “lower races” under certain conditions; this despite his vocal admonishment of colonialism’s effects on local and indigenous peoples. 27 And, as we shall see in Chap. 5, such a paternalistic attitude persisted well into the twentieth century in the relations between the world’s indigenous peoples and states, an attitude that others have shown to persist in the institutions, practices, and theories of international relations today. 28
In the chapters to follow I do not claim to perform a complete genealogy of a European discourse on civilization; rather, I set out to more specifically understand how a European discourse on civilization (understood according to the terms above) facilitated a process of ‘exclusion by inclusion’ over the course of international society’s evolution and expansion—a process that continues to this day. So, it is with this in mind that I turn to the next section, where I detail my critique of the orthodox account of the evolution and expansion of international society—an account that sidesteps a more comprehensive engagement with the colonial and imperial interconnections of European and non-European history, and thus, the more violent dimensions of a European discourse on civilization.
Westphalia and the Orthodox Account
The discipline of international relations has traditionally traced the history of modern international relations to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 (which was itself comprised of the Treaty of Münster and the Treaty of Osnabrück) and continues to perpetuate that account today. It was at that critical moment that the belligerents of the Thirty Years War are said to have established the foundational institution of international politics, sovereignty. By providing territorial units the power to exercise internal and external sovereignty over a prescribed territory, the Peace of Westphalia resolved the political turmoil caused by an unstable system characterized by secular and religious authorities with overlapping spheres of influence and power. However, a surge of historically minded research has provoked important new thought on the validity of that account. For example, it has been proposed that there is a lack of textual evidence within the treaties that comprise the Peace of Westphalia to support the idea that sovereignty was institutionalized at that moment, and that the account we know of it today results from political propaganda, as well as some suspect readings of the Peace itself. 29 Though the angles from which critiques of the conventional account of the Peace of Westphalia vary, they share in common a concern with its implications for the theorization of international relations today. Speaking to the narrative that has evolved around it, Barry Buzan and Richard Little refer to a Westphalian straightjacket, a concept that speaks to the idea that the theories of international relations tend to operate through an ahistorical framework that spatially and temporally fixes the sovereign state as the main point of reference, emphasizing continuity over difference and obscuring alternative sociopolitical forms and histories. 30
Critics of the conventional account of Westphalia thus draw our attention to the problematic biases that the discipline of international relations perpetuates by tracing the inception of the international system or society (depending on the scholar) to the heart of Europe, and the supposed institutionalization of the sovereign state. As such, these critical reflections are suggestive of the way the orthodox account of the evolution and expansion of international society—as epitomized by the joint works of Bull and Watson (The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics by Bull, The Expansion of International Society coedited by Bull and Watson, and to a lesser extent, The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis by Watson)—obscures the role of a European discourse on civilization in substantiating colonial and imperial endeavors. In an important critique of the conventional account of Westphalia, for example, Turan Kayaoglu describes the Eurocentric influence of it on international relations theory. Paying close attention to the English School, Kayaoglu details the normative dimensions of this narrative by drawing our attention to its role in the valorization of the West as the source of world order and modernity, and, in the process, the narrative’s role in the constitution of “a normative hierarchy in which the non-Western tortoise will never catch the European hare.” 31 Meanwhile, Sanjay Seth argues that Eurocentric origin stories have “sanitised” the colonial and imperial violence of international society’s expansion. 32 Indeed, perhaps more than any other branch of international relations theory, the English School’s account of the expansion has been accused of taking Eurocentric assumptions as historical facts, inhibiting a broader understanding of non-European contributions to the evolution of contemporary international relations, as well as masking the “darker face” of what Shogo Suzuki refers to as “Janus-faced European International Society.” 33
With these points in mind (points that I am in full agreement with, and to which I return), it must be acknowledged that there is a certain irony in my argument that follows: The Anarchical Society and The Expansion of International Society make relatively few references to the Peace of Westphalia itself, given their scope. 34 According to their respective indexes, the Peace of Westphalia appears only four times in The Anarchical Society 35 and only five times in The Expansion of International Society (though I am aware of several other cases). 36 In fact, of the core texts identified above, the only one to pay the Peace of Westphalia any sustained attention is The Evolution of International Society. In it, Watson devoted a chapter to discussing the settlement and the events around it by noting its significance for the subsequent evolution of European international society, in particular, how the “wartime practices [of the coalition aligned against the Holy Roman Empire] were established by the Westphalian settlement as the rules of the new commonwealth of Europe.” 37 But, with that said, it is not difficult to tease out the Westphalian assumptions that underpin the joint works of Bull and Watson in The Anarchical Society and The Expansion of International Society. In keeping with Kayaoglu’s argument, for example, both texts depict the expansion as a unidirectional process, characterized by the projection of European power into the non-European world—a process that resulted in the gradual inclusion of non-European states within international society. It is, in other words, a story that depicts Europe as the progenitor of contemporary institutions and world order via the universalization of the Westphalian state. In fact, Bull would later draw a direct connection between the Peace of Westphalia and the inception of international society in his contribution to Hugo Grotius and International Relations. “What the Peace of Westphalia did mark […] was the emergence of an international society as distinct from a mere international system, the acceptance by states of rules and institutions binding on them in their relations with one another, and of a common interest in maintaining them.” 38 Although it might be unfair to read this statement into Bull’s earlier publications, it is hard to imagine that the conventional story of the Peace of Westphalia was not, at least, informing his take on the subject matter at hand. For, in this passage, we see the Peace of Westphalia playing the role of a gateway between the systemic interactions of European powers and the evolution of societal behavior between and amongst them.
If it is true that the orthodox account is underpinned by a conventional account on the Peace of Westphalia (an account that is increasingly up for debate), then it is reasonable to subject its claims and conclusions to critique. In that respect, much of what is to follow centers on a critique of The Expansion of International Society, and that is because it is not just one of the most important texts on the evolution and expansion of international society (if not the most), 39 it is also one of the most important contributions of the wider English School to international relations theory. Brunello Vigezzi points out that The Expansion of International Society is marked by important convergences with the work of the British Committee, as well as represents the development of Bull’s thought since the initial publication of The Anarchical Society in 1977. 40 In a way that speaks directly to the interests of this book, Schulz suggests that it was in this text “that the orthodox account was developed in full.” 41 Prior to engaging in a critique of The Expansion of International Society, however, I would like to make an important note. Despite some misconceptions, The Expansion of International Society does concern itself with the relations between European and non-European societies. 42 The problem is that this engagement does not occur in a sustained and comprehensive way—and by that I mean, in a way that is attuned to the agency of Europeans and non-Europeans alike, in the constitution of the global space—until the twentieth century. In that respect, the argument that Bull and Watson do not engage with non-European societies is only a half-truth; what is really problematic is why they do not engage with non-Europeans as agents in the story of international society before the twentieth century. 43 Indeed, it is in that question that the Eurocentric assumptions and implications of the conventional account of Westphalia come to the foreground.
To begin, Bull and Watson were explicit in their Eurocentrism, rationalizing it in fact, rather than acknowledging it as supposition. “Because it was in fact Europe and not America, Asia, or Africa that first dominated and, in so doing, unified the world, it is not our perspective but the historical record itself that can be called Eurocentric.” 44 Perhaps, but does the “historical record” really substantiate the relative marginalization of non-European political histories? As John M. Hobson rightly points out, the historical record to which Bull and Watson refer “excludes almost all Eastern contributions to the rise of Europe and to globalization.” 45 And what is interesting about this point is that it is one that Bull seems to admit when he acknowledges the relative exclusion of Asia’s influence from the story of expansion, as well as the inherent problems associated with the idea that major non-European powers are only written into the story of the expansion as fully autonomous entities once “they came to pass a test devised by nineteenth-century Europeans.” 46 Rather than explore these non-European political histories (as well as their relationship to European ones), however, Bull justifies their exclusion by quickly noting the adoption of a European system/society of sovereign states and its institutions by non-Europeans. 47 What is apparent here, I think, is reluctance on the part of Bull to diverge from a conventional account of Westphalia, which he uses—at least implicitly—to substantiate the prominent role accorded to European states in the constitution of world order. Rather than engage with non-European political histories, Bull tries to make them fit with conventional tropes (even if he is aware of the issues with doing so), resulting in the marginalization of non-European political agency until the twentieth century. In other words, non-Europeans only become important to the story of international society once they assume membership within international society in the mold of Westphalian states (though it must be noted that this does not signal their equality within it). 48
If a conventional account of Westphalia helps us understand the historical neglect of non-Europeans as agents in the story of international society, it is fair to say that it has also conditioned the way the orthodox account thinks about world order. Though he acknowledged that international society was not “historically inevitable or morally sacrosanct,” 49 Bull did perceive it as the most realistic option for the generation of world order in practice. And, for Bull, this was important because of its relationship to the betterment of humankind; specifically, because he ties international order to the advancement of world order amongst humankind. 50 Though it is difficult to disagree with this moral purpose of international society, a case can be made that the way Bull goes about arguing it has the effect of downplaying non-European contributions in its constitution. Citing a wider body of critical research, for example, Schulz notes that the moral purpose ascribed to international society results in its description as a “teleological force for good,” a consequence of which is the effacement of European imperialism. 51 Citing the work of Kayaoglu and Keene, Hobson suggests that Bull and Watson’s approach to the constitution of world order is one that effectively licenses European imperialism, “insofar as it served to spread the ‘benefits’ of European international society to the non-Western world.” 52 From this vantage point, we can then see how Bull’s benign reference to the “historical record” is turned into a Eurocentric account of Europe’s imperial expansion, as rationalized by its normative purpose in international relations. But even if we do not go quite this far (though I believe Hobson is correct on this point), another point can be made; the Bull and Watson account of world order is one that leads to a story that recasts Europe’s imperial expansion as a process of inclusion. Again, that is not to say that Bull and Watson were not aware of or even concerned by the more violent aspects of the expansion; but, it is to say that they largely fail to engage with these aspects in a meaningful way. Instead, they tender a limited account of the expansion that focuses on the adoption of European institutions by non-Europeans. 53 That is, a process that begins with the demise of Latin Christendom, the emergence of a states system in Europe, and the subsequent expansion of a European international society that became global over time. Leaving aside the fact that the entry of non-European states in this story is often depicted as a destabilizing force (at least for the value-base of international society), 54 the description of this process as one of inclusion suggests that the emergence of non-Western states relied on a sort of Western benevolence. For Seth, this is problematic because it deemphasizes the agency of non-Europeans by accounting for their inclusion as a kind of moral awakening on the part of Western states, and because it skirts the much more malicious effects of international society’s expansion. 55 Where indigenous peoples are concerned, for instance, Roger Epp observes that Bull and Watson’s account of the evolution and expansion of international society—when we take stock of its colonial and imperial origins—can be (re)told as a history of “exclusion” and “homogenization.” 56 In the process of explaining the expansion as an inclusionary process rooted in the triumph of the sovereign state, the story effaces a colonial history, particularly in the Americas, that was simultaneously characterized by “a repudiation of other modes of coexistence and a domestication of the aboriginal peoples.” 57
As is being suggested, the orthodox account of the evolution and expansion of international society—as epitomized by the joint works of Bull and Watson, especially The Expansion of International Society—is one that avoids a comprehensive and sustained engagement with non-European political history until the twentieth century, despite being fundamentally concerned with it (by virtue of the orthodox interest in the expansion of a European international society into the non-European world). Doing so, it skirts a troubling history of colonial and imperial exploitation connected to a European discourse on civilization, while at the same time asserting the normative value of international society as a mechanism for world order. However, that account of the expansion is not unaware of non-Europeans (as noted above). Watson’s The Evolution of International Society placed an emphasis on understanding the competing non-European systems of the ancient world, and Bull had considered the idea of a study—one that would ultimately lead to The Expansion of International Society—that would involve a concern with “the encounters between European and non-European political entities (the Ottoman, Chinese and Mogul empires, African Kingdoms and tribes etc.).” 58 Nevertheless, what the above suggests is that the orthodox account of the evolution and expansion of international society is underpinned by a Westphalian origin story that masks Europe’s colonial and imperial expansion, blinding us to the interconnection between European and non-European political histories in the making of the global space.
Focus and Historical Timeline
By placing a focus on the historical relations between indigenous peoples and international society, this book seeks to broaden the English School’s account of the evolution and expansion of international society through the telling of a “connected history.” That is because the normative bias that Bull held for international society—as the means for generating world order, and possibly even justice—limited him in what he could say about the substate peoples that resided within the territorial boundaries of its members. This is the case on at least two levels. First, by conceptualizing sovereign states as the primary unit of international society (if not “the principal institutions” in ensuring the smooth functioning of its rules), 59 Bull diminished the relevance of non-state societies for contemporary global politics. For example, in The Anarchical Society, Bull distinguished between international society and “primitive stateless societies.” 60 The problem with this, as Karena Shaw observes, is that Bull’s “argument clearly establishes the international arena as a particular—modern, secular—space in which their [indigenous peoples’] ontologies are inappropriate.” 61 This is important, because, second and related, by rendering indigenous peoples “primitive” (and, effectively, unimportant to the study of international relations), Bull diminishes the agency of indigenous peoples as global political actors. That is not only on face value of the term “primitive,” but also a consequence of logic. Given that every corner of the world is now claimed by states—with the exception of Antarctica—it would seem to follow that “primitive” societies are now subsumed within “modern” states.
This perspective is not limited to the English School; rather, it is symptomatic of a discipline that has until recently focused on the state-to-state relations of international politics. For much of the mainstream international relations literature, for example, decolonization rectified colonial wrongs through the extension of territorial sovereignty to the former colonies of Europe. Problematically, that view overlooks the fact that decolonization did very little to resolve the substate claims of peoples ensconced within old and newly defined territorial boundaries. This was especially true for indigenous peoples residing in the settler states of the Americas, who were almost entirely bypassed by the official processes of United Nations’ decolonization in the mid-twentieth century. And, this was also true for indigenous peoples who found themselves encased within newly created states in Africa and Asia. Indeed, indigenous peoples have been largely overlooked by the international relations literature in general and the English School in particular (though on both counts, the literature has grown over the past decade or two). 62 This may be a consequence of not just theoretical issues but practical ones as well. If it is true that the sovereign state has served as international relations’ main focus of attention, indigenous political activity in the global space challenges us to rethink this view. For example, Ronald Niezen observes that sovereignty is contested by indigenous calls for self-determination at both the international and domestic levels. Where the former is concerned, this includes a move on the part of indigenous transnationalism to revise the norms and values of international society through an engagement with international law (as is discussed in Chap. 5), and where the latter is concerned, this involves “a pluralistic force within states that presses for realization in practice of the notion, […] of nations within nations, peoples who have rights to self-determination nested within their rights as citizens of states.” 63 In a way that speaks to the points raised by Inayatullah and Blaney on the question of cultural difference, these points thus speak to the role of indigenous transnationalism in contesting assimilationist processes through the recognition of cultural identities. Considering the critical role sovereignty has played in the discipline of international relations then, as well as the effacement of cultural difference through the universalizing and homogenizing narratives of international relations, an engagement with indigenous peoples and their political histories can provoke some uncomfortable questions about its theory and practice.
The flip side of this, however, is that a focus on the relations between indigenous peoples and states can also benefit the English School, and the wider discipline of international relations via a better understanding of the historical relations that constituted the global space in which we now live (a process that has already been taken up by others). With a growing push in the literature to take stock of non-state actors involved in global politics (especially in the context of globalization), a conceptual space has opened for research into non-state actors like indigenous peoples and their historical relations with states. Since about the beginning of the new millennium, for example, this has been evidenced by growing interest in the indigenous transnational movement, both inside and outside the confines of the United Nations. This movement has achieved a number of important gains that challenge conventional thought on international relations, in particular, the role of non-state actors in shaping the norms, values, and institutions of the global space. 64 Moreover, the emergence of the indigenous transnational movement has lent credence to academic efforts that blur the distinction between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’ to speak more broadly of the ‘global.’ But with that said, Marshall Beier cautions us to remember that indigenous diplomatic activity goes beyond a mere focus on the events in state-based organizations at the international level; indeed, they are “much more broadly sited, far more nuanced and complex, and more wholly sui generis than a focus on recent developments at the UN alone might reveal them to be.” 65 Thus, in taking stock of this reminder, the ensuing chapters do not aim to provide a singular, definitive account of the role indigenous peoples have played in global politics. Rather, I set out to contribute a more modest analysis of a European discourse on civilization in shaping the relations between indigenous peoples and international society. What follows then is a “connected history” focused on the historical relations between indigenous peoples and international society, with a special emphasis on understanding the colonial and imperial constitution of these relations through a European discourse on civilization and its legacies. To achieve that, I take the colonial encounter as my point of departure—as informed by postcolonial theory, which, broadly speaking, sees imperialism as central to the constitution of international relations and the identities of actors therein. 66 From here, I trace the relations between indigenous peoples and international society to the realization of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007. Given this expansive timeline, chapters proceed by delineating three loosely defined historical periods: the colonial, imperial, and postcolonial periods (see below). Selection of these periods is informed by research on the evolution of international law. Here, I draw especially on Anghie’s rough periodization of international law and Bowden’s historical analysis of civilization. Where Anghie is concerned, he describes his periodization as follows, “Vitoria and the sixteenth century represent naturalism, the nineteenth century positivism and the twentieth century pragmatism.” 67 Where Bowden is concerned, he traces a European discourse on civilization from the thirteenth century on, with reference to key historical figures and events that also figure prominently in this book. 68
Of note, particular attention is paid during these periods to the role of major international organizations, especially during the twentieth century. Acknowledging Beier’s important caution, noted above, this focus is not intended to diminish the relevance of alternative sites through which indigenous diplomacy has occurred. For example, one might consider the role of indigenous peoples on the Arctic Council, the realization of the Sami Parliament, or the creation of Nunavut, amongst many others. While each of these sites is significant in its own right, the focus on international organizations in this book is a consequence of focus. That is to say that organizations like the United Nations and the League of Nations are important to an analysis of the historical relations between indigenous peoples and states, and not because I believe that these organizations necessarily represent some manifestation of international society. Rather, it is because it was through these kinds of organizations that indigenous peoples made some of their first appeals to the members of international society. Moreover, it is important not to discount the ways by which indigenous peoples have engaged in these multilateral forums. Indeed, the move on the part of indigenous transnationalism to advance its interests through the established language of human rights (especially on the issue of self-determination), in organizations like the United Nations, can be conceptualized “as an emerging form of indigenous political resistance.” 69 For these reasons, it is my view that these organizations offer an ideal site for tracing a European discourse on civilization in shaping the relations between indigenous peoples and international society.
As mentioned above, the historical periods discussed in this book are loosely referred to as the ‘colonial,’ ‘imperial,’ and ‘postcolonial’ periods. The colonial period refers to a period of time bookended by the onset of Spanish colonialism in the sixteenth century and the emergence of a European international society in the nineteenth century (though it is acknowledged that others have associated the emergence of a European international society with preceding centuries). The imperial period refers to a period of time bookended by the entry of non-European members into European international society in the nineteenth century and the interwar period of the twentieth century. Finally, the postcolonial period refers to a period bookended by the dismantlement of European empires in the mid-twentieth century and the adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007.
Argumentation and Chapter Summaries
Despite my criticism of the orthodox account, the fact remains that the English School has maintained an interest in the concept of civilization, usually being mentioned as a discriminatory benchmark to define membership in the society of states. But, in my view, The Expansion of International Society did not sufficiently engage with the full implications of a wider European discourse on civilization. Where civilization is addressed in a comprehensive way, it is usually discussed with reference to the standard of civilization, which was discussed by Gong “as an explicit legal principle” that non-Western states had to grapple with if they were to gain entry into the society of states. 70 In that respect, it is true that The Expansion of International Society did begin to tease out the role a European discourse on civilization played in the evolution and expansion of international society, but it did so in narrow terms. For example, Gong’s chapter on the entry of China into the society of states is deeply concerned with the concept of civilization, but from the vantage point of the standard of civilization, which emerged at the turn of the twentieth century. Specifically, Gong suggests that China’s entry into European international society resulted from the imposition of unequal treaties that asserted Europe’s extraterritorial influence and pressured China to conform to European international society’s standards. 71 In fact, it was in the same year that The Expansion of International Society was published that Gong published The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society, which focused on the emergence of a standard of civilization—articulated through positive international law—that pressured non-European countries to conform to European standards, heavily premised on the sociopolitical and cultural characteristics of European international society. Accordingly, Gong pushed the orthodox account down a more critical path by paying closer attention to the negative implications of civilization for aspiring non-European members. But, with that said, Gong’s account remained fundamentally interested in the process of inclusion, in particular, how the membership of international society was broadened to include non-Western members. As is being suggested then, Gong’s more critical analysis is valuable for the role it played in drawing attention to the more discriminatory dimensions of international society’s evolution and expansion, but it was somewhat limited in how far it went down that critical path. 72 Its rather narrow focus on the standard of civilization overlooks the role of a wider European discourse on civilization in hierarchically stratifying the global space, as well as denying non-European peoples membership in the society of states—and not because those peoples necessarily failed to meet the criteria of the standard, but because they had already been subsumed within international society and its members (e.g., the Cherokee Nation, who are discussed in Chap. 3). It is that function of civilization that this book is interested in; that is, the role of a European discourse on civilization in advancing a process of ‘exclusion by inclusion.’
In terms of similar arguments on the interplay between inclusion and exclusion, Inayatullah and Blaney have detailed the role of homogenizing discourses in international relations that sidestep and even obfuscate cultural difference. 73 Dipesh Chakrabarty, meanwhile, has argued for the provincializing of Europe as a way to begin the process of recognizing a plurality of non-Western and subaltern histories that have been obscured by Eurocentric, universalizing discourses. 74 And, Hobson has demonstrated how contemporary international theory is indebted to a history of Eurocentric thought that includes racist, imperial, and paternalistic assumptions that can both subsume and push non-Europeans to the margins of disciplinary concern. 75 And, this is not to mention the work of others, especially Anghie’s Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law and Bowden’s The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea, both of which engage in a critical reappraisal of the origins of contemporary international law and society, and to which I am deeply indebted. In addition to this critical body of literature, it must also be recognized that investigations into the relationship between inclusion and exclusion are not foreign to the English School. Martin Wight’s “theory of mankind,” for example, explicitly addressed the issue of relations with “barbarians,” which included specific reference to the relations between Western powers and indigenous peoples. 76 Moreover, critical and second-generation English School scholarship has shown a growing interest in revising the story of international society’s evolution and expansion. Edward Keene’s, Beyond the Anarchical Society, for example, represents an attempt to rethink the purported effects of international society in generating world order. In fact, Keene draws our attention to a European imperial process that saw the ‘partition’ of the world, that is, a partition defined by “an order promoting toleration within Europe, and an order promoting civilization beyond.” 77 Speaking directly to the interests of this book, Keal calls into question the very legitimacy of international society by focusing our attention on the colonial and imperial evolution of its relations with indigenous peoples. In what is probably the most comprehensive English School engagement with indigenous political histories, European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Keal does so by describing the erosion of indigenous peoples’ rights over the course of the expansion through an inside-outside dichotomy of inclusion and exclusion. Suzuki, meanwhile, challenges orthodox accounts through a critical engagement with the expansion of European international society, paying attention to the relationship between European imperialism (especially its civilizing impulses) and its effects on the international socialization of China and Japan. 78 And, this is not to mention others like Buzan and George Lawson’s work on the crucial role of the nineteenth century in the evolution and expansion of international society, focusing especially on the “complex configuration of industrialization, rational state-building and ideologies of progress [including the concept of civilization].” 79
The reason for this very brief review of the literature is to situate much of what is to follow in the coming chapters, a “connected history” that engages the English School in a cross-theoretical dialogue with postcolonial theory to deepen our understanding of the evolution and expansion of international society. Focused on the relations between indigenous peoples and international society, I argue that the story of international society has been underwritten by a discourse on civilization that subsumed indigenous peoples within its boundaries over the course of its expansion, thereby facilitating their exclusion from the ‘international.’ In this book, this line of argumentation unfolds in five chapters (excluding this Introduction), beginning with a detailed description of the theoretical framework of this book, then progressing through three more empirically minded chapters on the colonial, imperial, and postcolonial history of the relations between indigenous peoples and international society, and finally concludes by way of a chapter concerned with the implications of its main line of argumentation for international relations. Below, I present short chapter summaries for the purpose of reference.
Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical framework and conceptual foundations of the book. Building on the work of Buzan and Keene, respectively, it proposes an analytical framework that takes seriously the relations(hips) between state and non-state societies operating in a global space. 80 On this basis, the theoretical framework of this book contributes to scholarship interested in the concept of world society and its relationship to international society. With these analytics established, the chapter proceeds to describe a cross-theoretical dialogue between the English School and postcolonial theory—one that understands their core concepts, themes, and interests to be complementary elements in the telling of “connected histories.” It is through that dialogue and history that the book seeks to deepen our understanding of the colonial and imperial origins of international relations, specifically by taking the English School down a critical path to broaden its understanding of the evolution and expansion of international society. That is, through a more sustained and comprehensive history of the relations between indigenous peoples and international society, and how they have come to shape contemporary institutions and the social content of the wider global.
Chapter 3 marks the first of three empirically driven chapters. Focused on what I loosely refer to as the colonial period, this chapter traces the evolution and expansion of international society through a European discourse on civilization. Here, I begin with the jurisprudence of Francisco de Vitoria; in particular, his role in articulating a natural law framework that would subsume the Amerindians within a European-derived legal framework. Vitoria’s natural law framework is important because, as others have shown, it would set precedents for subsequent stages of international law. To demonstrate how the historical constitution of international law came to exclude indigenous peoples through their inclusion within it, the chapter closes with a case study analysis of US Supreme Court cases involving the Cherokee Nation in the nineteenth century.
Building on the history discussed in Chaps. 3 and 4 turns to an analysis of the imperial period by describing the crystallization of a European discourse on civilization around the sovereign state at the turn of the twentieth century, specifically with reference to the standard of civilization. Whereas the standard of civilization has traditionally been discussed as a way of understanding the exclusion and subsequent inclusion of non-Western states in international society, this chapter concerns itself with its effects on the relations between indigenous peoples and the members of international society. Thus, it draws attention to the ways a civilizational discourse was used by the dominion of Canada and Great Britain to prevent the diplomatic mission of Chief Levi General, on behalf of the Six Nations, from being heard at the League of Nations.
Chapter 5 marks the last of the three empirically driven chapters, turning to an examination of the colonial legacies of civilization from the mid-twentieth century onward, with a specific interest in how the emergence of an indigenous transnational movement has challenged these legacies. Specifically, it argues that despite its more overtly discriminatory assumptions falling into disrepute in the mid-twentieth century, a European discourse on civilization persisted through new standards that impeded indigenous peoples from experiencing decolonization in the mid-twentieth century. This is achieved through a brief discussion of indigenous self-determination, which sets the stage for a critical analysis of the decolonization period that highlights the way self-determination bypassed indigenous peoples as a consequence of a United Nations discourse. The chapter then turns to the role of indigenous transnationalism in challenging the legacies of a European discourse on civilization, while reflecting on the way that this discourse persists.
Chapter 6 concludes the book by summarizing its main line of argumentation, and detailing its implications for international relations. Where the latter is concerned, it focuses on the implications of a cross-theoretical dialogue between the English School and postcolonial theory, the implications of a better understanding of ‘exclusion by inclusion,’ and a brief discussion of decolonizing international relations theory. Finally, the chapter concludes by discussing the legacies of a European discourse on civilization in the contemporary context, with reference to the realization of an indigenous right to self-determination in practice.
Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 24.
Inayatullah and Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference, 1:100.
Jack Donnelly, “Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?,” International Affairs 74, no. 1 (January 1998): 2, 3, 2.
This perspective on civilization draws especially on the work of Prasenjit Duara, and is discussed in more detail below with reference to a European discourse on civilization; see: Duara, “The Discourse of Civilization and Decolonization,” 1–2; See also: Duara, “The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism.”
Buzan and Little, “The Historical Expansion of International Society,” esp. 60–64; Schulz, “Civilisation, Barbarism and the Making of Latin America’s Place in 19th-Century International Society,” esp. 840–844 For guidance on my use of the terms ‘orthodox,’ ‘critical,’ and ‘second-generation’ in the context of English School literature on the subject of expansion, see Preface section, “Classification and Caricature.”
See Preface, endnote 5.
Broadly speaking I refer to: (1) colonialism as a form of domination that is undertaken by one society over another through the direct appropriation of territory; and (2) imperialism as a form of domination that is undertaken by one society over another through direct and indirect methods of control. In both cases, colonialism and imperialism are undertaken for the purpose of advancing the interests of the dominant society through the exploitation of the subordinate society. For a wider discussion of colonialism and imperialism (from which the preceding definitions have been influence by); see: Jürgen Osterhammel, Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, trans. Shelley L. Frisch, 2nd Markus Wiener Publishers Edition (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2005), esp. Chapter 1.
Bhambra, “Talking among Themselves?”; Bhambra, “Historical Sociology, International Relations”; Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity; Subrahmanyam, Explorations in Connected History: From the Tagus to the Ganges; Subrahmanyam, Explorations in Connected History: Mughals and Franks; Subrahmanyam, “Connected Histories: Early Modern Eurasia.”
Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, 37: Chapter 1.
For a wider discussion of the Eurocentric and racist origins of international theory, see: Hobson, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics.
Andrew Phillips, “Civilising Missions and the Rise of International Hierarchies in Early Modern Asia,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 42, no. 3 (June 2014): 699; Here, Phillips is referring to the idea of civility in Erasmus’ De civilitate morum peurilium, 1530, noted in: Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations, ed. Eric Dunning, Johan Goudsblom, and Stephen Mennell, trans. Edmund Jephcott, Revised Edition (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2000).
Phillips, “Civilising Missions and the Rise of International Hierarchies in Early Modern Asia,” 699–700, 700.
Duara, “The Discourse of Civilization and Decolonization,” 1.
Bowden, The Empire of Civilization, 23.
Bowden elaborates on the sociopolitical character of civilization, and its association with notions of progress, with specific reference to its origins in the French, English and German languages (though an important distinction is drawn between the terms “kultur” and “zivilisation” in German); see: Ibid., esp. Chapters 2 & 3.
Citing Jean Starobinski, Bowden refers us to the Trévoux Dictionnaire universel, 1743, which defined civilisation in the following way: “Term of jurisprudence. An act of justice or judgement that renders a criminal trial civil. Civilisation is accomplished by converting informations (informations) into inquests (enquêutes) or by other means [italics in the original].” Quoted in: Ibid., 26; As a point of note, Elias associates the origins of the term civilisation with the work of the elder Mirabeau, but acknowledges that “perhaps it had previously existed in conversation.” See: Elias, The Civilizing Process, 35.
Inayatullah and Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference, 1:esp. 42–51.
For a similar argument that engages critically with orthodox accounts of China and Japan’s ‘entry’ into international society, see: Suzuki, Civilization and Empire.
Osterhammel, Colonialism, 20.
Ibid., 20–21; Of note, Osterhammel refers us to a third form of control, “Non-colonial ‘determinant’ influence”, whereby “the economic superiority of the stronger national partner or of its private enterprise […] and/or its military protective function confers upon it opportunities to influence the politics of the weaker partner that its ‘normal’ neighbors do not possess.” See: Ibid., 21.
Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, 37:esp. Chapter 1; Bowden, The Empire of Civilization, esp. 112–117.
Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society.
On this point, Bowden draws our attention to the disciplinary function of anthropology and ethnology in supporting an association between a European discourse on civilization, sociopolitical organization, and progress; see: Bowden, The Empire of Civilization, esp. 53–59.
Quoted in: David Long, “Paternalism and the Internationalization of Imperialism: J.A. Hobson on the International Government of the ‘Lower Races,’” in Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations, ed. David Long and Brian C. Schmidt, SUNY Series in Global Politics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 76.
For a handful of works that explore the persistence of civilizational discourses in international relations, see: Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law; Bowden, The Empire of Civilization; Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society; Hobson, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics; Inayatullah and Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference; Suzuki, Civilization and Empire.
Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” International Organization 55, no. 2 (Spring 2001): esp. 260–268; For a number of critical reflections on the conventional account of the Peace of Westphalia, see: Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira, and John M. Hobson, “The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths That Your Teachers Still Tell You about 1648 and 1919,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 39, no. 3 (May 2011): 735–758; Siba N. Grovogui, “Regimes of Sovereignty: International Morality and the African Condition,” European Journal of International Relations 8, no. 3 (September 2002): 315–338; Inayatullah and Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference, 1:esp. Chapter 1; Kayaoglu, “Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory”; Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, esp. 18–22; Stephen D. Krasner, “Compromising Westphalia,” International Security 20, no. 3 (Winter/96 1995): 115–151; Sebastian Schmidt, “To Order the Minds of Scholars: The Discourse of the Peace of Westphalia in International Relations Literature,” International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 3 (September 2011): 601–623; Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations (London: Verso, 2003).
Barry Buzan and Richard Little, “Why International Relations Has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What to Do About It,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 30, no. 1 (January 2001): 24–28.
Kayaoglu, “Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory,” 196, esp. 193–197.
Sanjay Seth, “Postcolonial Theory and the Critique of International Relations,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 40, no. 1 (September 2011): 171, esp. 168–174.
Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 7, esp. 20–25.
In what follows, I critique key texts authored/edited by Bull and Watson, respectively and jointly, including The Expansion of International Society. It is acknowledged that a critique of this nature risks generalizing the arguments and positions of a large number of contributors to that edited collection. Thus, the critique is primarily focused on the chapters individually and co-authored by Bull and Watson, with references to others being used to highlight key points of critique.
Here I am specifically referring to the third edition of The Anarchical Society; see: Bull, The Anarchical Society.
These references to the Peace of Westphalia, as identified by the index of the first edition of The Expansion of International Society, appear in chapters written by Bull, Ali Mazrui, and Watson, respectively. See: Hedley Bull, “European States and African Political Communities,” in The Expansion of International Society, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 111; Ali Mazrui, “Africa Entrapped: Between the Protestant Ethic and the Legacy of Westphalia,” in The Expansion of International Society, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 296, 305, 306; Adam Watson, “European International Society and Its Expansion,” in The Expansion of International Society, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 27.
Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge,  2009), 195; One of Watson’s main sources of concern in The Evolution of International Society was understanding how different regions of the world similarly experienced systems characterized by an oscillation between hegemony on the one hand, and multiple independencies on the other hand. It is in this vein that he views the Peace of Westphalia; specifically, as a movement towards the latter in Europe (albeit, a movement that was not permanent). See: Ibid., esp. Chapter 17.
Hedley Bull, “The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations,” in Hugo Grotius and International Relations, ed. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 75–76.
Schulz, “Civilisation, Barbarism and the Making of Latin America’s Place in 19th-Century International Society,” 841.
Brunello Vigezzi, “The British Committee and International Society: History and Theory,” in Guide to the English School in International Studies, ed. Cornelia Navari and Daniel M. Green, Guides to International Studies (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2014), esp. 51–52.
Schulz, “Civilisation, Barbarism and the Making of Latin America’s Place in 19th-Century International Society,” 841.
Citing the work of Ian Clark, Carsten-Andreas Schulz makes an important distinction on this point; “Eurocentrism as a theory of history should not be confused with Eurocentricity as neglect of the non-European world. It is simply not the case that the English School has failed to engage with colonialism and its historical legacy.” See: Schulz, “Civilisation, Barbarism and the Making of Latin America’s Place in 19th-Century International Society,” 843; See also: Ian Hall, “The Revolt against the West: Decolonisation and Its Repercussions in British International Thought, 1945–75,” The International History Review 33, no. 1 (March 2011): 43–64.
Pearcey, “A Case of Exclusion by Inclusion,” esp. 441–444.
Bull and Watson, “Introduction,” 2.
Hobson, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics, 225; For a wider discussion on the influence of Asia in the makings of Europe, and contemporary international relations, see: Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation.
Hedley Bull, “The Emergence of a Universal International Society,” in The Expansion of International Society, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 123; See also: Richard Little, “Reassessing The Expansion of the International Society,” in System, Society & the World: Exploring the English School of International Relations, ed. Robert W. Murray (Bristol: e-International Relations, 2013), 20.
Bull, “The Emergence of a Universal International Society,” 124.
As Kayaoglu points out, non-Europeans remain in a subordinate position to the Western members of international society even after their entry, staying in a perpetual state of ‘catch-up.’ See: Kayaoglu, “Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory,” 195–196.
Bull, The Anarchical Society, 65.
Schulz, “Civilisation, Barbarism and the Making of Latin America’s Place in 19th-Century International Society,” 842; See also: Shogo Suzuki, “Japan’s Socialization in Janus-Faced European International Society,” European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 1 (March 2005): esp. Chapter 1.
Hobson, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics, 227.
Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, esp. Chapter 1.
The relationship between disorder, justice, and the entry of non-European societies into international society, especially in the mid-twentieth century, is a point of interesting debate. For example, the extent to which the entry of non-Europeans into international society actually undermined order through the destabilization of normative content of European international society and its institutions remains open to interpretation. For a number of perspectives, see: Hedley Bull, “The Revolt Against the West,” in The Expansion of International Society, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 217–228; For a number of perspectives, see: Ibid.; Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, “Conclusion,” in The Expansion of International Society, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 425–435; Hall, “The Revolt against the West: Decolonisation and Its Repercussions in British International Thought, 1945–75”; Stanley Hoffman, “Hedley Bull and His Contribution to International Relations,” International Affairs 62, no. 2 (Spring 1986): 179–195; Elie Kedourie, “A New International Disorder,” in The Expansion of International Society, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 347–355; Hidemi Suganami, “British Institutionalists, or the English School, 20 Years On,” International Relations 17, no. 3 (September 2003): 253–271.
Seth, “Postcolonial Theory and the Critique of International Relations,” 171.
Epp, “At the Wood’s Edge,” 312.
Quoted in: Vigezzi, “The British Committee and International Society,” 51.
Bull, The Anarchical Society, 68.
Ibid., esp. 57–62.
Shaw, Indigeneity and Political Theory, 1: 62.
See Preface, endnote 12.
Niezen, The Origins of Indigenism, 148.
Within the United Nations system, for example, achievements include the establishment of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, two International decades of the World’s Indigenous People, and the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The successes and limits of indigenous transnationalism are discussed in more detail in Chap. 5.
Beier, “Indigenous Diplomacies as Indigenous Diplomacies,” 2; Beier makes this statement in the introduction to an edited collection, with the purpose of contextualizing the perspectives of its authors; see: Beier, Indigenous Diplomacies.
Geeta Chowdhry and Sheila Nair, “Introduction: Power in a Postcolonial World: Race, Gender, and Class in International Relations,” in Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations: Reading Race, Gender and Class, ed. Geeta Chowdhry and Sheila Nair, vol. 16, Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics (London: Routledge, 2004), 2.
Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, 37: 11.
Bowden, The Empire of Civilization.
Niezen, The Origins of Indigenism, 147 Niezen made this comment over a decade ago. With the adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007 (discussed in Chap. 5), I believe it reasonable to conclude that this type of indigenous engagement at the international level has become an ‘established’, as opposed to an “emerging” form of resistance.
Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society, 14.
Ibid., Chapter 5; Gerrit W. Gong, “China’s Entry Into International Society,” in The Expansion of International Society, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 171–183.
For a few of other views on the work of Gong, similar to my own, see: Bowden, The Empire of Civilization, esp. 104–106; Hobson, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics, esp. 227–228; Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, esp. 17–18.
Inayatullah and Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference.
Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
Hobson, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics; See also: Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation.
Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, ed. Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1992), esp. Chapter 4; For a much wider discussion of Wight and his work, see: Ian Hall, The International Thought of Martin Wight, Palgrave Macmillan History of International Thought (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, 7.
Suzuki, Civilization and Empire.
Buzan and Lawson, The Global Transformation, 135: 1.
Here, I am referring to two works in particular; see: Buzan, From International to World Society?; Keene, “The Standard of ‘Civilisation’, the Expansion Thesis and the 19th-Century International Social Space.”