Abstract
Research groups divide the kind of labor that it takes to create scientific knowledge among their members—cognitive labor, but also the manual labor of experimental practice and the social effort that it takes for a group member to interact. But how do groups divide labor? And hence, what does an epistemological approach to the division of labor in groups need to take into account? To answer these two questions, I begin by revisiting social epistemology’s existing discussion about the division of labor in science, a discussion primarily focused on scientific peer communities (Sect. 6.1).
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Wagenknecht, S. (2016). Division of Labor. In: A Social Epistemology of Research Groups. New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52410-2_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52410-2_6
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