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The Institutions of Fiscal Policy

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Macroeconomic Policy after the Crash

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Abstract

In this chapter, we turn to discuss the politics of fiscal policy—namely the reason why the democratic process might not deliver optimal outcomes—and the proposals that economists have made for how to address these deficiencies.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. BNP Paribas Investment Partners, Dartford, UK

    Richard Barwell

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  1. Richard Barwell
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Barwell, R. (2016). The Institutions of Fiscal Policy. In: Macroeconomic Policy after the Crash . Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-51592-6_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-51592-6_15

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-137-51591-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-137-51592-6

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