Abstract
Soviet-Yugoslav relations were highly volatile after Moscow’s intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, which the Yugoslavs denounced while siding with the cause of Czechoslovak reformers. Fearful of Soviet intentions, the Yugoslav leadership courted support in the Balkans (from Romania and even Albania), but especially in the West, notably the United States. The course of internal reform in Yugoslavia, especially its anti-centric direction, created an appearance of weakness that in turn encouraged further Soviet influence. However, any attempt by Tito’s government to discipline the reformers would weaken Yugoslavia’s bargaining position with the Soviets. The situation changed following American rapprochement with China when the Soviets were forced to improve relations with Yugoslavia. That in turn allowed Tito to go after the domestic reformers and resulted in the intervention in Croatia in December 1971. Yugoslav political independence was achieved by sacrificing ideological independence. The price was huge. Shorn of the illusions of hope, reform and domestic sovereignty, Yugoslav unity began to crumble.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2017 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Banac, I. (2017). ‘We Did Not Quarrel, We Did Not Curse’: The Price of Yugoslav Independence After the Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia. In: Rajak, S., Botsiou, K., Karamouzi, E., Hatzivassiliou, E. (eds) The Balkans in the Cold War. Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-43903-1_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-43903-1_8
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-137-43901-7
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-43903-1
eBook Packages: HistoryHistory (R0)