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Because Women Are People

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The Moral Case for Abortion

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Abstract

With all our focus on whether a fetus is a person, it is easy to overlook something that is simple, straightforward and easy to verify. At no point in pregnancy does a woman stop being a person.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Judith Jarvis Thomson (1971). A defense of abortion. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1, republished in Louis Pojman and Francis J. Beckwith (1998). The Abortion Controversy: 25 Years After Roe v. Wade, A Reader, 2nd edn. Belmont: Wadsworth, pp. 117–132.

  2. 2.

    Stephen D. Schwarz (1990). The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago: Loyola University Press.

  3. 3.

    John Harris (1975). The Survival Lottery. Philosophy, 50(191), 81–87.

  4. 4.

    See Bertrand Russell (1946). A History of Western Philosophy and Its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day. London: George Allen and Unwin, pp. 728–746.

  5. 5.

    David S. Oderberg (2000a). Applied Ethics: A Non-Consequentialist Approach. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 22–31.

  6. 6.

    Cited in Rosalind Pollack Petchesky (1986). Abortion and Women’s Choice: The State, Sexuality and Reproductive Freedom. London: Verso, p. 3.

  7. 7.

    Emily Jackson (2001). Regulating Reproduction: Law, Technology and Autonomy. Oxford: Hart.

  8. 8.

    Ellie Lee, Jennie Bristow, Charlotte Faircloth and Jan Macvarish (2014). Parenting Culture Studies. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

  9. 9.

    Lynn M. Paltrow and Jeanne Flavin (2013). The policy and politics of reproductive health arrests of and forced interventions on pregnant women in the United States, 1973–2005: Implications for women’s legal status and public health. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 38(2), 299–343.

  10. 10.

    Paton v. Trustees of British Pregnancy Advisory Service [1978] 2 All 987 and Paton v. UK [1980] ECHR 408 discussed in S. Sheldon (1997). Beyond Control: Medical Power and Abortion Law. London: Pluto Press, pp. 87–90.

  11. 11.

    Mark Wicclair (2011). Conscientious Objection in Health Care: An Ethical Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  12. 12.

    Christian Fiala and Joyce H. Arthur (2014). “Dishonourable disobedience” – Why refusal to treat in reproductive healthcare is not conscientious objection. Woman Psychosomatic Gynaecology and Obstetrics, 1, 12–23.

  13. 13.

    For example the British Medical Association provides conscientious objection guidance for doctors and medical students and the General Medical Council has clear rules on how doctors must behave when they choose to object.

  14. 14.

    See Bernard M. Dickens (2014). The right to conscience. In Rebecca J. Cook, Joanna N. Erdman and Bernard M. Dickens (Eds.), Abortion Law in Transnational Perspective: Cases and Controversies. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

  15. 15.

    Katha Pollitt (2014). Pro: Reclaiming Abortion Rights. New York: Picador, pp. 4–5.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. British Pregnancy Advisory Service, Faversham, UK

    Ann Furedi

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  1. Ann Furedi
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© 2016 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s)

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Cite this chapter

Furedi, A. (2016). Because Women Are People. In: The Moral Case for Abortion. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-41119-8_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-41119-8_6

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-137-41118-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-137-41119-8

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