Risk-Reduction Measures in Kashmir

An earlier version of this essay was originally published in Michael Krepon and Michael Newbill, eds., Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures in South Asia, report no. 26 (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, November 1998), 1–24.Google Scholar

United Nations Security Council, “Report of Sir Owen Dixon, United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, to the Security Council,” General S/1791, incorporating S/1791/Add.1 (September 15, 1950).Google Scholar

See H.S. Gururaj Rao, Legal Aspects of the Kashmir Problem (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1967), Appendix XXII, and Hasan, The Kashmir Question, 249–79.Google Scholar

There was fighting in Kashmir in 1971, but the dispute was not itself the cause of war. See Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994),Google Scholar

and Rchard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Succession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) for discussions of the 1971 War.Google Scholar

The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2001–2002 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, October 2001).Google Scholar

There are conflicting figures (e.g., 84,471 square miles, given in Alan J. Day, ed., Border and Territorial Disputes, 2nd Edition (Harlow, UK: Longman Group, 1987).Google Scholar

These and other area data are taken from Alastair Lamb, Kashmir, a Disputed Legacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 14–15. Lamb indicates that India revised the figure in 1961 to 86,023, “because of the official inclusion in India of the Aksai Chin.”Google Scholar

The UN Military Observer group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) has 44 military officers of whom half are available at any one time to investigate violations of the ceasefire. Investigations are carried out only on the Pakistani side of the LoC. For an authoritative study of UNMOGIP, see Pauline Dawson, The Peacekeepers of Kashmir: The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (London: Hurst & Company, 1994).Google Scholar

Also see Robert G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 68–75.Google Scholar

For a good account of the insurgency, see Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict (London/New York: IB Tauris, 2000);Google Scholar

Manoj Joshi, The Lost Rebellion: Kashmir in the Nineties (New Delhi: Penguin India, 1999), is informative but partisan;Google Scholar

Robert G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute (New York: Palgrave, 1997), chapter 4, is another dispassionate source.Google Scholar

Human Rghts Watch, India’s Secret Army in Kashmir: New Patterns of Abuse Emerge in the Conflict, Human Rghts Watch Country Report (New York: Human Rghts Watch, 1996), 2. Also HRW Report 2001 at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/kashmir/back.htm.Google Scholar

See Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, 206–16. Also Brian Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army, 2nd Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 375–92.Google Scholar

Mehmood Ahmad Sagar, All Parties Hurriet Conference Jammu and Kashmir, A Profile (Muzaffarabad, Azad Jammu and Kashmir: APHC, May 7, 1994). See Alexander Evans’ website for organization of the APHC: http://www.kashmir-group.freeserve.co.uk/APHC%20Organizational%20Structure.htm.Google Scholar

United Nations, “Extracts from Record of Discussions held between Commander-in-Chief Pakistan Army and Chief of Army Staff, India,” UN Observers Manual, Amendment 20 (1969), Annex F to chapter 1, 1. Other sections dealt with adjustments to the Line, the flight of light aircraft in the region, and the evacuation of defended Localities or “picquets” by both sides. CBMs concerning high-level military contact, exercises, and air movement have been translated into wider agreements so far as the international border between India and Pakistan is concerned. For a discussion of these agreements, see Sumit Ganguly, “Mending Fences,” in Krepon, ed., Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building, and Reconciliation in South Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 11–24Google Scholar

and Sony Devabhaktuni and Matthew C. J. Rudolph, “Key Developments in the Indo-Pak CBM Process,” in Michael Krepon, Khurshid Khoja, Michael Newbill and Jenny S. Drezin, eds., A Global Survey of Confidence-Building Measures (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999).Google Scholar

See George J. Tenet, “Worldwide Threat-Converging Dangers in a Post 9/11 World,” Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence (February 6, 2002), Internet: http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/dci_speech_02062002.html.Google Scholar

Bruce Riedel, “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House,” Policy Paper Series 2002 (Philadelphia: Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, May 2002), Internet: http://www.sas.upenn.edu/casi.Google Scholar