Introduction

  • Orhan Kayaalp
Chapter

Abstract

Contrary to the ecumenical flavor that has long emanated from price theory, an unmistakable aura of provincialism pervades fiscal theory. The local color is, in fact, so thick in the latter sphere of economic scholarship that an analysis of the development of fiscal thought along national parameters is in order. A few relevant surveys do exist, but each focuses on the evolution of a selected national body of fiscal thought. An illustrious example is that of James Buchanan, in which the Italian tradition in fiscal theory was presented in detail.1 In more recent times, David Lindenfeld has surveyed the nineteenth-century German university curricula geared to train officials in different areas of public service, including public finance.2 The only work that alluded to a national taxonomy of fiscal doctrines was that of Richard Musgrave and Alan Peacock, in which were collected representative excerpts from the works of pivotal British, Austrian, Italian, German, Dutch, French, and Swedish writers in the theory of the public economy.3 Musgrave and Peacock did not intend to trace the evolution of various national fiscal doctrines: their aim was rather to impart a sense of the many dimensions endemic to the theory of the public economy from the mouths of the selected authors.4 Such an intention is discernible in a later work of Musgrave’s, in which he traces the development of five central themes in the theory of public finance.5

Keywords

Public Economy National Element Economic Logic Fiscal Authority Marginal Valuation 
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Notes

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Copyright information

© Orhan Kayaalp 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Orhan Kayaalp
    • 1
  1. 1.Lehman CollegeThe City University of New YorkUSA

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