In the Shadow of the Nazi-Soviet Pact

Abstract

The negotiations that had started in April between the three great powers of Great Britain, France and the USSR progressed sluggishly. Impatience in Moscow grew as the weeks passed without any significant progress. The stalemate also presented Hitler with an opportunity which he did not hesitate to use. Underlying his decision to attack Poland was the hope that war could be contained between Poland and Germany. This might best be achieved if an agreement could be reached with the Soviet Union. At first, the Soviet government reacted very cautiously to Hitler’s approaches. It had not forgotten what he had said about Germany’s aims in the east, but it did not trust the Western powers either and was primarily concerned to prevent the formation of an anti-Soviet coalition of Great Britain, France and Germany. The German Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, assured the Russians that there was no problem between the Baltic and the Black Sea that could not be solved to the complete satisfaction of both countries. Finally Stalin agreed to allow von Ribbentrop to come to Moscow on 23 August 1939 to sign a non-aggression pact and a secret protocol attached to it. The pact was signed the same evening after brief negotiations.