Political Parties and the Politics of the Quality of Government

  • Philip Keefer
Chapter
Part of the Executive Politics and Governance book series (EXPOLGOV)

Abstract

The assertion that well-functioning institutions and the quality of government go hand in hand seems easy to accept. We think of well-functioning state institutions as smoothly translating the demands of citizens into the design and implementation of public policy – like a well-oiled machine, for example. However, scholars and policy makers are not always so ready to accept the equation when political parties become part of the institutional conversation. Although the noun “machines” is utterly neutral, discussions of “party machines” are usually not: parties with machines are those that most efficiently channel public resources as private benefits to party members. Even enlightened leaders have viewed parties as incubators of division and vehicles of cronyism. Development professionals often think of parties first in the context of illicit campaign finance and the influence of elites and special interests. In the scholarly community, parties as institutions supportive of economic development and the quality of government remain poorly understood.

Keywords

Collective Action Political Party Party System Party Member Collective Action Problem 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© Philip Keefer 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Philip Keefer

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