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China’s Foreign Policy Goals and Its Foreign Aid and Investment Diplomacy

  • John F. Copper

Abstract

The main purpose of China’s foreign aid and foreign investments was, and is, to help Chinese leaders realize foreign policy objectives. Hence, taking cognizance of and assessing China’s external goals, complex as they are, makes its aid and investments more comprehensible.

Keywords

Foreign Investment Foreign Policy Chinese Communist Party Soft Power Chinese Leader 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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© John F. Copper 2016

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