China’s Evolving Attitudes and Approaches toward UN Collective Security
Since the 1970s, China’s perceptual and behavioral orientations toward UN multilateralism in general and collective security in particular have experienced sea changes—from initially viewing UN collective security as unwanted interference in another country’s affairs and as a manifestation of Western imperialism hence illegitimate to a great extent to becoming more tolerant but looking on unconcerned at the collective security measures of the UN to not just accepting the legitimacy of UN collective security measures, but also participating selectively in these operations. With China’s increasing involvement in UN multilateralism and collective security, Beijing’s views on national sovereignty, the legitimacy of use of force, and the role of UN in global order and governance, the boundary between international and intranational conflicts has been evolving more toward international norms. While initially Beijing’s changing orientation toward UN collective security might have been largely dictated by circumstances and practical necessity, in the long run, its UN multilateral diplomacy is not just an ad hoc or short-term reaction to outside stimulus. It does not merely serve the traditional function of external balancing or utility generating, but also indicates Beijing’s growing interest in establishing a less instrumental and more rule- and norm-based international order.
KeywordsForeign Policy Security Council Chinese Leader Major Power International Peace
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 1.Thomas Christensen, “Pride, Pressure, and Politics: The Roots of China’s Worldview,” in Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang, eds., In the Eyes of the Dragon, China Views the World (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 240.Google Scholar
- 2.Samuel Kim, “China and the United Nations,” in Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, eds., China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), 42–89.Google Scholar
- 3.Zheng Yongnian, “Asia’s Security Dilemma and the Building of Asian Collective Security System,” Peace and Development, No. 5 (2011): 2–3.Google Scholar
- 4.Ya Zicheng and Wang Rihua, “Schools of Diplomatic Thought during the Period of Spring and Autumn and Warring Parties,” Science of International Politics, No. 2 (2006): 118–120.Google Scholar
- 5.Li Zhaojie, “Legacy of Modern Chinese History: Its Relevance to the Chinese Perspective of the Contemporary International Legal Order,” Singapore journal of International & Comparative Law, No. 5 (2001): 318–319.Google Scholar
- 13.Ren Xiao, “From Collective Security to Cooperative Security,” World Economic and Politics, No, 4 (1998): 10–12.Google Scholar
- 15.James M. Burns, Roosevelt, the Soldier of Freedom, Book club edition (New York: History Book Club, 2006), 404.Google Scholar
- 16.Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell’s Mission to China (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1953), 357Google Scholar
- 18.Wang Jie, On International Mechanism. (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2002), 459.Google Scholar
- 32.Han Nianlong, ed., China Today: Diplomacy (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Science Press, 1987), 384.Google Scholar
- 46.Samuel S. Kim, China, the United Nations, and World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 209.Google Scholar
- 50.Bennett A. Leroy, International Organizations, Principles and Issues (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995), 100.Google Scholar