The Civil War in British Military Thought

  • Nimrod Tal

Abstract

From the outset the Civil War caught the British military’s attention. For its scale and scope, because of politicians’ involvement in military affairs and generals’ intervention in politics, for the introduction of new technologies, and for its actual and potential impact on their country, British officers observed closely the American conflict. As Hugh Dubrulle has argued, during the war British military men looked almost solely to the Confederacy for positive lessons. Professionally, Britons thought that the Confederate States Army executed its military operations on a level near perfection. On political grounds, they supported the South’s struggle for national independence, the preservation of its agrarian, genteel way of life, and its social and political hierarchies. British military thinkers attributed the Confederacy’s superb military conduct to these values and goals. By contrast, they viewed the North as imposing an unwanted national unity and decadent lifestyle on the South. Northern institutions — especially capitalism and mass democracy that the British regarded as derivatives of mob rule — appalled Britain’s military elite, who regarded those institutions as the source of the North’s military weaknesses and failures.1 These were seen also as the reason for the war’s massive scale and horrific casualties.

Keywords

Interwar Period Military Affair American Power Modern Warfare British Culture 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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