Ryle on Perception

Abstract

The philosophy of perception is certainly not Ryle’s main preoccupation, though he turns his attention to it on several occasions. His most extensive treatment of perception can be found in The Concept of Mind, where he dedicates a whole chapter to the topic. Some of the ideas are fleshed out and elaborated later in Dilemmas and in the article ‘Sensation’. Among the recurring subjects is the difference between perception and sensation, the critique of sense-data and the grammar of perception verbs such as ‘see’, ‘hear’, ‘observe’, and so on. However, the reception of these writings is neither extensive nor well-disposed. Most commentators concentrate on the negative and critical parts of Ryle’s discussion of perception, and on his dismissal of sense-data in particular. Yet, Ryle’s considerations about perception contain many constructive suggestions, which in my view are paid too little attention. In my contribution to this volume, I will take account of these suggestions in order to give a fairer and more comprehensive picture of Ryle’s account of perception.