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Ryle and Strawson on Category Mistakes

  • Jonathan Dancy
Part of the Philosophers in Depth book series (PID)

Abstract

In the volume of essays on Gilbert Ryle published in 1970 by George Pitcher and Oscar Wood, there is a paper by Peter Strawson on categories. In my contribution to this new volume on Ryle, I go through some now well-recognised difficulties with Ryle’s own treatment of categories, and in particular of category mistakes. I then consider some general problems that beset the efforts of others to do better, before turning to Strawson’s suggestions, which as far as I can discover have never been discussed in print. These suggestions have obvious merits, but I end by arguing that they are less than fully successful.

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References

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© Jonathan Dancy 2014

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  • Jonathan Dancy

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