R. G. Collingwood and a “Philosophical Methodology” of Aesthetics

Abstract

R. G. Collingwood’s The Principles of Art has enjoyed something of a resurgence in interest thanks to the endeavours of scholars such as Aaron Ridley who have proposed a reading that refutes the charge of ontological Idealism as articulated by Richard Wollheim and engages with the dimensions of Collingwood’s aesthetic philosophy that deal with expression and imagination. David Davies has endorsed Ridley’s argument and taken this “revisionism” one step further by proposing a “performative” interpretation of Collingwood’s theory of art based on Collingwood’s conception of the work of art as an activity rather than the product of an activity.¹ Nevertheless, he also highlights a series of puzzles that Collingwood cannot fail but generate when he attempts to reconcile the conception of art as activity with the art/craft distinction. He concludes by suggesting that, despite these ambiguities, it is Collingwood’s novel conception of art as a “language” that enables us to better understand the structure of The Principles of Art and Collingwood’s significance as a commentator on the role of imagination in the experience of art.