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Abstract

The EU’s confidence in and practice of the peace-through-trade policy originates from the theory that an increase in trade leads to universal benefits (which expands to include peace). This notion was first mentioned at around AD 100, when Plutarch wrote about how sea trade allowed man to cooperate and “redress defects” in their relationship with one another through mutual exchange.1 This ideal was given more attention in the 1700s when Montesquieu specified that peace is a “natural” consequence of trade,2 it then gained momentum into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This chapter focuses on the theory concerned with the EU’s belief in the peace-through-trade policy. Indeed, it is this belief that led Brussels to implement its peacethrough-trade policy when dealing with foreign states.

Keywords

Gross Domestic Product Trading Partner Asymmetric Distribution Liberal Democracy World Bank 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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© Amir M. Kamel 2015

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  • Amir M. Kamel

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