Fichte and Transcendental Philosophy pp 47-57 | Cite as
Is Fichte’s Position Transcendental Philosophy?
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Abstract
The theme of Fichte and transcendental philosophy or even transcendental method is difficult since there is no agreement in the literature about what “transcendental philosophy” means. At present, any claim can be only normative, based on one’s interpretation of the term “transcendental.” What I offer is some preliminary remarks with the modest aim not of disposing of the problem but rather of clarifying some aspects.
Keywords
Pure Reason Critical Philosophy Transcendental Idealist German Idealism Transcendental Philosophy
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Notes
- 1.See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). This edition is cited in the text as B followed by the page number.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- 2.See Paul W. Franks, All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).Google Scholar
- 3.See Paul Redding, Continental Idealism: Leibniz to Nietzsche (London: Routledge, 2009).Google Scholar
- 4.G. W. F. Hegel, Werke, 20 vols. (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1971), XX, 387.Google Scholar
- 5.See G. E. Moore, “Refutation of Idealism,” Mind, n.s., 12, no. 48 (Oct. 1903), 433–453.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- 6.Peter Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (London: Methuen, 1966), 97.Google Scholar
- 7.See John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), viii.Google Scholar
- 8.Henrich, who traces transcendental argumentation to Wittgenstein and Austin, refers especially to Bennett’s and Strawson’s Kant interpretation. See Dieter Henrich, The Unity of Reason: Essays on Kant’s Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 127.Google Scholar
- 9.See Kant, AA IV, 458; Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 62.Google Scholar
- 10.See, for example, Adolf Schurr, Philosophie als System bei Eichte, Schelling und Hegel (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1974).Google Scholar
- 11.Kant differentiates two models of system: Weltbegriff and Schulbegriff. See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B867. Reinhold, who overlooks this distinction, goes back beyond Kant to a view of system presupposed by Chr. Wolff and Lambert, viz., the unity of cognition through an underlying principle or foundation. See, on this point, A. von der Stein, “Der Systembegriff in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung,” in A. Diemer, ed., System and Klassifikation in Wissenschaft und Dokumentation (Meisenheim: Hein, 1968), 10ff.;Google Scholar
- see also F. Kambartel, “‘System’ und ‘Begründung’ bei und vor Kant,” in Theorie und Begründung (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1976), 41ff.Google Scholar
- 12.See Martin Bondeli, Das Anfangsproblem bei Karl Leonhard Reinhold. Eine systematische und entwicklungsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zur Philosophie Reinholds in der Zeit von 1789 bis 1803 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1995), 13.Google Scholar
- 13.For comparison of Reinhold’s and Kant’s view of philosophy as system, see Wilhelm Teichner, Rekonstruktion oder Reproduktion des Grundes: Die Begründung der Philosophie als Wissenschaft durch Kant and Reinhold (Bonn: Bouvier, 1976).Google Scholar
- 14.Fichte, The Science of Knowledge, trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); cited hereafter as SK followed by the page number.Google Scholar
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© Tom Rockmore 2014