Strategic Behavior in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Impact and Policy Responses

  • Rohan Pitchford
  • Mark L. J. Wright
Part of the International Economic Association Series book series (IEA)

Abstract

The restructuring of sovereign debt is time consuming. For the period since 1970, the time between an initial default on a debt and the final restructuring of that debt has averaged roughly seven years (Pitchford and Wright 2007). These delays show little sign of abating. Argentina’s default of 2000 remains unresolved at the time of writing, and US courts have recently affirmed the use of pari passu clauses to prevent the servicing of new debts while previously issued debt remains in default and hence limits a country’s ability to borrow again.1 Likewise, although Greece used the domestic legislation to promptly restructure privately held bonds issued under Greek law in 2012, a future restructuring involving offcial creditors and foreign law bondholders appears inevitable.2

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References

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Copyright information

© International Economic Association 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rohan Pitchford
  • Mark L. J. Wright

There are no affiliations available

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