Setting the Scene: The US War on Terrorism

  • Carolin Hilpert
Chapter
Part of the New Security Challenges Series book series (NSECH)

Abstract

Two things came together after 9/11 which both play a major role in this book: Germany’s post-war history, and US and international policies in Afghanistan. In the more than forty years preceding the terrorist attacks, Germany’s security policy had witnessed an extraordinary evolution — starting as an almost demilitarized society after the Second World War, Germany eventually came to send its forces to bombard Serbia without a UN mandate.1

Keywords

Security Policy Bush Administration Central Intelligence Agency Defense Minister Operation Enduring Freedom 
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Notes

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    For a much more detailed discussion on this development, see C. Hilpert, Accidental Combatants: German Strategic Culture and the Bundeswehr’s Deployment to Afghanistan (doctoral dissertation, Munich: University of the Federal Armed Force, 2012).Google Scholar
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© Carolin Hilpert 2014

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  • Carolin Hilpert

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