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Propaganda, Power, and Cohesion in Chinese Politics

  • Kingsley Edney
Part of the Asia Today book series (ASIAT)

Abstract

What role does propaganda play in the Chinese political system? What is the relationship between power and propaganda? How should we begin to think about the influence of domestic propaganda on China’s engagement with discourses beyond its borders? This chapter attempts to address these questions in order to provide a general foundation on which further investigation and analysis can be built. The first section briefly explains the contemporary development of Chinese views on propaganda. The second section examines the various ways in which scholars, using concepts such as soft power and public diplomacy, have understood the influence of the Party-state’s domestic propaganda practices on China’s international relations. The third section develops an approach to propaganda and power that can be applied to the Party-state’s practices at both the domestic and international levels, highlighting the relationship—but also the difference—between the Party-state’s use of propaganda to exercise power and its broader engagement in ideological struggles over discourse. The Party-state’s use of propaganda practices involves both the articulation of particular discourses and the disruption and suppression of unwanted articulations that could threaten the Party-state’s hegemonic political project.

Keywords

Soft Power Official Discourse Public Diplomacy Ideological Struggle Official Narrative 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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© Kingsley Edney 2014

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  • Kingsley Edney

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