Strategy and Foreign Policy in Great Britain, 1930–1938: From the Pursuit of the Balance of Power to Appeasement

  • B. J. C. McKercher
Chapter
Part of the Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World book series (SCCCW)

Abstract

The strategic basis of British foreign policy built around the ‘appeasement’ of adversarial Powers began with the rise of the Conservative, Neville Chamberlain, to the premiership in May 1937. Before this moment, although appeasement had a tradition in English and, later, British external relations stretching back to the seventeenth century if not before, the country’s diplomatists had employed it only tactically to support grand strategy. Since at least the reign of Elizabeth I until the late 1930s, this strategy comprised the pursuit of the balance of power — changing alliances or drawing close to other Powers to preclude the regional hegemony of one nation or alliance.1 It occurred, first, in relation to Western Europe and the security of the home islands and, then, as the expanding British Empire saw policy-makers in London defend the manifold interests of the only world Power, in key areas of the globe. Thus, appeasement had been just one of a number of tactical alternatives in the planning and execution of British foreign policy designed to ensure the security of Britain’s national and Imperial interests. These alternatives also included working with other Powers politically or militarily in short-term arrangements or longer-term alliances, unilateral threats or the use of military action, a reliance on conference diplomacy, and more.

Keywords

Foreign Policy Armed Conflict Defence Spending Grand Strategy Modus Vivendi 
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Notes

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