Abstract
At the dawn of the twentieth century counterinsurgency policies based on the removal and relocation of civilian populations emerged as viable and acceptable practices in warfare. Three wars, in particular, set important precedents for the Western world in the way in which militaries dealt with guerrillas and irregular insurgents. These wars involved Spain in Cuba, the United States in the Philippines, and Britain in South Africa, and all three saw the evolution of similar strategic, operational, and tactical practices by the Western powers. At the strategic level, the powers sought the destruction of guerrilla and irregular military forces in order to end insurgencies and, in the case of the Boers, end a conventional war that had entered a guerrilla warfare phase. Operationally, the powers employed campaign designs that focused on separating the guerrillas from their principal sources of support, which were the friendly civilian populations, thereby enabling the military defeat of the weakened guerrilla armies. At lower tactical levels, military commanders isolated the guerrillas by establishing fortified lines that cut their operational areas into manageable sectors and then removed the civilian populations. Simultaneously, they swept the sectors clean of enemy forces by driving the guerrillas to destruction unto fixed barriers.
Keywords
Concentration Camp Military Defeat Guerrilla Warfare British Army Enemy ForcePreview
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Notes
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