A New Course of Action

  • Edward J. Erickson
Chapter

Abstract

To say that the Ottoman army was unprepared to deal with an insurrection in its rear areas understates greatly its strategic dilemma in the spring of 1915. The prewar general staff anticipated renewed war against the Balkan states but not against any of Europe’s Great Powers. This left the Ottomans badly positioned for a multifront war against the Entente, particularly against Russia in Caucasia and Britain in Mesopotamia. Since the Ottomans did not anticipate war against the Great Powers, likewise they did not make plans to deal with an Armenian insurrection, which was itself an outgrowth of alliance warfare. Consequently, no significant combat forces were positioned within the interior core area containing the empire’s critical lines of communications. Moreover, a centrally located strategic reserve did not exist, nor did the means exist to deploy such a force rapidly if it was needed, further limiting military options. This strategic posture constrained a coherent Ottoman military response to rear-area security concerns in eastern Anatolia, in effect forcing the army toward a resource-driven counterinsurgency “strategy of poverty” employing relocation, which was itself a new course of action.

Keywords

Tactical Area General Staff Provincial Governor Relocation Decision Armenian Population 
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Notes

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© Edward J. Erickson 2013

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