The Practical Turn

  • Daniel J. Hill
  • Daniel Whistler

Abstract

We argue that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has noticeably shifted over the past couple of decades. We call this shift from concentrating on beliefs to concentrating on actions or practices ‘the practical turn’. Before the shift, we contend, the courts tended to view actions, such as the exhibition or wearing of religious symbols, solely in the light of their function of expressing antecedent religious beliefs. The courts then asked themselves whether the actions really manifested the beliefs. Recently, we suggest, the courts have been happier to assume that the actions do manifest the beliefs, and then to weigh up the believer’s right to manifest faith in that way with the competing rights of others.

Keywords

ECtHR case-law practical turn Article 9 ECHR religious symbolism and belief 

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Notes

  1. 1.
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Copyright information

© Daniel J. Hill and Daniel Whistler 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniel J. Hill
    • 1
  • Daniel Whistler
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of LiverpoolUK

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