The Methodological Irrelevance of Reflective Equilibrium

  • Tristram McPherson
Chapter

Abstract

John Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium is the most influential methodology in contemporary ethics. This chapter argues that this influence is undeserved. Rawls’ method is highly implausible. Worse, it is also incapable of performing the work that motivates the search for a moral methodology in the first place. These are bold charges, and I dedicate the bulk of the chapter to substantiating them (sections 3–5). Several of the objections that I offer have been pressed before. However, when such objections are pressed in isolation from each other, it can seem easy to salvage the spirit (if not the letter) of the method, by judicious adjustment. It is much more difficult to do this once the inadequacies of the method are systematically displayed. I illustrate this point by exploring salient attempts to salvage the spirit of reflective equilibrium by abandoning elements of Rawls’ approach (section 6). I argue that none of these attempts succeed. I conclude that appeal to the method of reflective equilibrium is not a helpful means of addressing pressing methodological questions in ethics. In a slogan, reflective equilibrium is methodologically irrelevant.

Keywords

Moral Judgment Ethical Theorize Moral Theory Moral Sensibility Moral Conception 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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© Tristram McPherson 2015

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  • Tristram McPherson

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