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More Actors, Less Coordination? New Challenges for the Leaders of a Rising China

  • Thomas J. Christensen
Chapter
Part of the Asan-Palgrave Macmillan Series book series (APMS)

Abstract

There is a large difference between the way that many pundits and journalists outside of China analyze China’s recent trends in foreign policy and the way that many of Chinâs own experts discuss the same phenomena. In American and European newspapers, one often sees references to a new and assertive Chinese grand strategy that reflects the rise of China and the decline of the United States, especially since the financial crisis began in 2008. The implication is that a new Chinese strategy emerged as a rationally calculated response to China’s increased power and influence.

Keywords

Foreign Policy Chinese Communist Party Grand Strategy National Security Council Interagency Coordination 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.
    Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (March/April 2011): 68–79.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, New Foreign Policy Actors in China, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 26, September 2010.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (Oxford University Press, 2009).Google Scholar
  4. 5.
    For a discussion of the roots of the alleged “Malacca Dilemma,” see Ian Storey, “China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma,’” China Brief, May 17, 2006, Association for Asian Research, http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2873.html.Google Scholar
  5. 6.
    Major General Luo Yuan and a few of his colleagues called for economic, military, and diplomatic retaliation against the United States. See Chris Buckley, “China PLA Offi cers Urge Economic Punches Against US,” Reuters February 9, 2010, and Rowan Callick, “China Goes Ballistic Over Taiwan Arms Sale,” The Australian, February 2, 2010.Google Scholar
  6. 7.
    For detailed coverage of this evolution, see Michael D. Swaine and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Assertive Behavior—Part Two: The Maritime Periphery,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 35 (Summer 2011), 1–29.Google Scholar
  7. 8.
    For press coverage of Dai’s 9,000-word essay, see Michael Moore, “China Will Not Replace the United States as the World’s Main Superpower,” Daily Telegraph, December 8, 2010.Google Scholar
  8. 9.
    See Wang Jisi, “Zhongguo de guoji dingwei yu ‘taoguang yanghui yousuo zuowei’ de zhanlue sixiang,” Guoji wenti yanjiu, February 2010: 4–9; “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy,” 68–79.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© The Asan Institute for Policy Studies 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Thomas J. Christensen

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