Abstract
Well-designed and effectively implemented fiscal rules hold a lot of promise. They may help contain a deficit bias, reduce the time inconsistency of budgetary policies, strengthen the credibility of a government’s commitment to fiscal sustainability and facilitate countercyclical fiscal management. By increasing the predictability of fiscal policy, fiscal rules can also lower output volatility and boost long-term growth.
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© 2013 Ana Corbacho and Teresa Ter-Minassian
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Corbacho, A., Ter-Minassian, T. (2013). Public Financial Management Requirements for Effective Implementation of Fiscal Rules. In: Allen, R., Hemming, R., Potter, B.H. (eds) The International Handbook of Public Financial Management. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137315304_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137315304_3
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