Britain in Global Politics Volume 2 pp 62-81 | Cite as
Britain, the United States and the Issue of ‘Limited War’ with China, 1950–54
Abstract
It is a well-established staple of the literature that the Korean War exposed the ‘special relationship’ to one of its earliest and sternest Cold War tests. British and American support for the United Nations (UN) in condemning the North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950, together with their subsequent military contributions — vast in the case of the US, still significant on the UK side — to the United Nations Command (UNC), helped foster an outward impression of unity. Behind the scenes, however, the Labour government of Clement Attlee and the Democratic administration of Harry S. Truman were often divided. Historians have given due consideration to a number of Korean issues insofar as they impacted on Anglo-American relations. These include: British reluctance to bow to American pressure to match moral disapproval of North Korea’s actions with a military commitment to the UNC; the decision to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea, in October 1950, followed by China’s entry into the war; the possible use of nuclear weapons and the Truman-Attlee talks of December 1950; and British concerns about the bellicosity of UN commander, General Douglas MacArthur.1 Compared with these matters, the Truman administration’s efforts in 1951 to secure a UN resolution denouncing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as an aggressor for its Korean intervention has received less attention.2
Keywords
United Nations Chinese Intervention American Relation 38th Parallel Foreign OfficePreview
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Notes
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