The Importance of Independence II: Freedom and Integrity
Chapter
Abstract
This chapter makes six first-best ethical arguments for respecting personal independence, arguing that individual consent is a constituent part of what makes most social interaction and economic interaction just. The final section responds to a potential criticism.
Keywords
Joint Project Social Cooperation Trade Model Reasonable People Mutual Obligation
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Notes
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© Karl Widerquist 2013