Recall that Near the End of Chapter I, I had asked you to rate the clarity of the language in the Constitution on a scale of 1 (not very clear) to 10 (crystal clear). My rating was a “6.” Obviously, I don’t know what your rating was, but I’m quite confident that it was less than a 10. I am so confident because, as we saw in chapter 1, unarguably at least some of the language in the Constitution is less than crystal clear. The inevitable result is that, at least some of the time, to determine whether a law or an administrative action is constitutional some approach will be needed to figure out what the constitutional language in question means.
KeywordsRepresentative Democracy Supreme Court Decision Voucher Program Fourteenth Amendment Constitutional System
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- 2.For a fuller discussion of his approach, see: Antonin Scalia, “Originalism: The Lesser Evil,” Cincinnati Law Review 57 (1989): 849–865 andGoogle Scholar
- Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).Google Scholar
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