Harry Truman and the Decisions to Intervene in the Korean War and to Cross the 38th Parallel

  • Alex Roberto Hybel
Chapter

Abstract

A crisis decision involves “a response to a high threat to values, either immediate or long range, where there is little time for decision under conditions of surprise.”1 North Korea’s surprise decision in June 1950 to cross the 38th parallel dividing it from South Korea placed the administration of Harry Truman in a crisis mode. It compelled the president to make two distinct decisions. Shortly after the invasion, Truman had to decide whether to assist South Korea militarily. His decision to help led to the implementation of a UN military counterattack under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. After the UN forces pushed the North Korean troops to retreat to their homeland, Truman faced a second critical decision: Whether to allow MacArthur’s forces to cross the 38th parallel in an attempt to unify the Korean peninsula under a regime friendly to the United States. Despite being forewarned by China that it would not tolerate such an act, Truman authorized MacArthur and his forces to march into North Korea. China responded with a massive attack. A costly war of attrition ensued. On July 27, 1953, the parties involved in the conflict signed an armistice agreement. The two Koreas remained divided.

Keywords

Foreign Policy Security Council Central Intelligence Agency National Security Council 38th Parallel 
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Notes

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© Alex Roberto Hybel 2014

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  • Alex Roberto Hybel

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