Why the West Fears Islam pp 83-105 | Cite as
Securitization of Islam in Europe: The Embodiment of Islam as an Exception
Abstract
European nations face a paradox: even though they seek to facilitate the socioeconomic integration of Muslims, antiterrorism and security concerns fuel a desire to compromise liberties and restrict Islam from the public space. The securitization paradigm encompasses the multifaceted process through which the normal rule of law is suspended in favor of exceptional measures justified by extraordinary situations that threaten the survival of the political community. As noted by Weaver and Buzan, the initial authors of this paradigm, securitization operates outside the domain of “normal politics,” because it aims to respond to an existential threat.I In the case of Islam, it involves political actors who apprehend Islam as an existential threat to European and American political and secular order and thereby argue for extraordinary measures to contain it. A successful securitization rests on the capacity of a securitizing actor (primarily state officials and politicians) to “speak security,” namely, to present a certain problem as a significant menace that challenges the survival of a referent group or community, in a way that resonates with a “significant audience.” In this regard, Islamic extremism, especially since 9/11 and 7/7, has become a key security issue across the Atlantic.
Keywords
Asylum Seeker Immigration Policy Islamic School Existential Threat Religious AffairPreview
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Notes
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