Against Relative Truth

  • Ilkka Niiniluoto
Chapter
Part of the History of Analytic Philosophy book series (History of Analytic Philosophy)

Abstract

Jan Woleński and Peter Simons give in their article ‘De Veritate’ (1989) a vivid account of the ‘Austro-Polish obsession with truth’. Another impressive proof of this obsession is the collection of Woleński’s historical essays (Woleński, 1999a). After Kazimierz Twardowski’s seminal paper in 1900, Polish logicians and philosophers have been staunch and passionate supporters of the absolute notion of truth. Woleński and Simons (1989, p. 422) even suggest that Alfred Tarski did not introduce relativization of truth to a model in the 1930s ‘for fear it would lead to relativism’. On the other hand, what Tarski called the ‘the classical Aristotelian conception of truth’ is a relational notion, as shown by the medieval formula veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus (Woleński, 1993, p. 330). This relational character is compatible with the objectivity of truth. Indeed, in my view, Tarski’s model-theoretical concept of truth amended with the notion of truthlikeness provides an adequate basis for a fallibilist critical scientific realism (see Niiniluoto, 1987; 1999a). While some ways of relativizing truth are ‘innocent’ from the viewpoint of a realist, who wishes to defend the epistemological status of science, it is important to show why relativists of various sorts are mistaken in their claims that all truths are relative to persons, communities, cultures, beliefs, paradigms, or perspectives.1

Keywords

Objective Truth Correspondence Theory Coherence Theory Vienna Circle Group Belief 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Barnes, B., and Bloor, D. (1982) ‘Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge’, in M. Hollis, and S. Lukes (eds) Rationality and Relativism (Oxford: Blackwell), 21–47.Google Scholar
  2. Barwise, J., and Etchemendy, J. (1987) The Liar (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
  3. Boyd, R. (1984) ‘The Current Status of Scientific Realism’, in J. Leplin (ed.) Scientific Realism (Berkeley: University of California Press), 41–82.Google Scholar
  4. Brandom, R. (1994) Making it Explicit (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).Google Scholar
  5. Cappelen, H., and Hawthorne, J. (2009) Relativism and Monadic Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Carnap, R. (1942) Introduction to Semantics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).Google Scholar
  7. Danto, A. (1973) ‘Nietzsche’s Perspectivism’, in R. Solomon (ed.) Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays (New York: Anchor Books), 29–57.Google Scholar
  8. David, M. (2004) ‘Theories of Truth’, in I. Niiniluoto, M. Sintonen, and J. Wole ński (eds) Handbook of Epistemology (Dordrecht: Kluwer), 331–414.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Dummett, M. (1978) Truth and Other Enigmas (London: Duckworth).Google Scholar
  10. Garcia-Carpintero, and M., Kölbel, M. (eds) (2008) Relative Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
  11. Hautamäki, A. (1986) ‘Points of View and their Logical Analysis’, Acta Philosophica Fennica, 41, (Helsinki: Societas Philosophica Fennica).Google Scholar
  12. Hempel, C. G. (1935) ‘On the Logical Positivists’ Theory of Truth’, Analysis, 2, 49–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Hintikka, J. (1962) Knowledge and Belief (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).Google Scholar
  14. — (1973) Time and Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press).Google Scholar
  15. Horwich, P. (1990) Truth (Oxford: Blackwell).Google Scholar
  16. Kaila, E. (1979) Reality and Experience (Dordrecht: D. Reidel).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Kirkham, R. L. (1992) Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).Google Scholar
  18. Kokoszyń ska, M. (1936) ‘Über den absoluten Wahrheitsbegriff und einige andere semantische Begriffe’, Erkenntnis, 6, 143–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Krausz, M., and Meiland, J. W. (eds) (1982) Relativism: Cognitive and Moral (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press).Google Scholar
  20. Kusch, M. (1991) Foucault’s Strata and Fields (Dordrecht: Kluwer).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Meiland, J. (1977) ‘Concepts of Relative Truth’, The Monist, 60, 568–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Mou, B. (2009) Substantive Perspectivism: An Essay on Philosophical Concern with Tr uth (Dordrecht: Springer).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Niiniluoto, I. (1982) ‘Remarks on the Logic of Perception’, in I. Niiniluoto, and E. Saarinen (eds) Intensional Logic: Theory and Applications, Acta Philosophica Fennica, 35, (Helsinki: Societas Philosophica Fennica), 116–29.Google Scholar
  24. — (1987) Truthlikeness (Dordrecht: D. Reidel).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. — (1994) ’Defending Tarski against His Critics’, in J. Woleński (ed.) Sixty Years of Tarski’s Definition of Truth (Cracow: Philed), 48–68.Google Scholar
  26. — (1998) ‘Induction and Probability in the Lvov-Warsaw School’, in K. Kijania-Placek, and J. Woleński (eds) The Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer), 323–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. — (1999a) Critical Scientific Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
  28. — (1999b) ‘Tarskian Truth as Correspondence — Replies to Some Objections’, in J. Peregrin (ed.) The Nature of Truth — If Any (Dordrecht: Kluwer), 91–104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. — (1999c) ‘Theories of Truth: Vienna, Berlin, and Warsaw’, in J. Woleński, and E. Köhler (eds) Alfred Tarski and the Vienna Circle (Dordrecht: Kluwer), 17–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. — (2000) ‘Scepticism, Fallibilism, and Verisimilitude’, in J. Sihvola (ed.) Ancient Scepticism and the Sceptical Tradition (Helsinki: Societas Philosophica Fennica), 145–69.Google Scholar
  31. — (2001a) ‘Information, Meaning, and Understanding’, in L. Lundsten, A. Siitonen, and B. Österman (eds) Communication and Intelligibility (Helsinki: Societas Philosophica Fennica), 43–54.Google Scholar
  32. — (2001b) ‘Future Studies: Science or Art?’ Futures, 33, 371–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. — (2002) ‘Kotarbiński as a Scientific Realist’, Erkenntnis, 56, 63–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. — (2003a) ‘Science as Collective Knowledge’, in M. Sintonen, P. Ylikoski, and K. Miller (eds) Realism in Action (Dordrecht: Kluwer), 269–78.Google Scholar
  35. — (2003b) ‘Carnap on Truth’, in T. Bonk (ed.) Language, Truth, and Knowledge: Contributions to the Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (Dordrecht: Kluwer), 1–25.Google Scholar
  36. — (2004) ‘Tarski’s Definition and Truth-Makers’, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 126, 57–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. — (2006) ‘The Poverty of Relative Truth’, in T. Aho, and A. V. Pietarinen (eds) Truth and Games: Essays in Honour of Gabriel Sandu (Helsinki: Societas Philosophica Fennica), 165–74.Google Scholar
  38. — (2009) ‘Facts and Values — A Useful Distinction’, in S. Pihlström, and H. Rydenfelt (eds) Pragmatist Perspectives (Helsinki: Societas Philosophica Fennica), 109–33.Google Scholar
  39. Niiniluoto, I., Sintonen, M., and Woleński, J. (eds) (2004) Handbook of Epistemol-ogy (Dordrecht: Kluwer).Google Scholar
  40. Pap, A. (1952) ‘Note of the “Semantic” and the “Absolute” Concept of Truth’, Philosophical Studies, 3, 1–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  41. Peregrin, J. (ed.) (1999) The Nature of Truth — If Any (Dordrecht: Kluwer).Google Scholar
  42. Popper, K. (1972) Objective Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
  43. Putnam, H. (1981) Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  44. Siegel, H. (1987) Relativism Refuted: A Critique of Contemporary Epistemological Relativism (Dordrecht: D. Reidel).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  45. — (2004) ‘Relativism’, in Niiniluoto, Sintonen and Woleński (2004), 747–80.Google Scholar
  46. Sinaceur, H. B. (2009) ‘Tarski’s Practice and Philosophy: Between Formalism and Pragmatism’, in S. Lindström et al. (eds) Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism (Dordrecht: Springer), 357–96.Google Scholar
  47. Swoyer, C. (1982) ‘True For’, in M. Krausz, and J. W. Meiland (eds) Relativism: Cognitive and Moral (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press), 84–108.Google Scholar
  48. Tarski, A. (1944) ‘The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4, 341–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  49. — (1956) ‘The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages’, in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 152–278.Google Scholar
  50. Woleński, J. (1989) Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School (Dordrecht: Kluwer).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  51. — (1993) ‘Tarski as a Philosopher’, in F. Coniglione, R. Poli, and J. Woleński (eds) Polish Scientific Philosophy: The Lvov-Warsaw School (Amsterdam: Rodopi), 319–38.Google Scholar
  52. — (1999a) Essays in the History of Logic and Logical Philosophy (Cracow: Jagiellonian University Press).Google Scholar
  53. — (1999b) ‘Semantic Conception of Truth as a Philosophical Theory’, in Peregrin (1999), 51–65.Google Scholar
  54. Woleński, J., and Simons, P. (1989) ‘De Veritate: Austro-Polish Contributions to Truth from Brentano to Tarski’, in K. Szaniawski (ed.) The Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School (Dordrecht: Kluwer), 391–442.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  55. von Wright, G. H. (1984) ‘Truth and Logic’, in Philosophical Papers III (Oxford: Blackwell), 26–41.Google Scholar
  56. — (1996) ‘Truth-Logics’, in Six Essays in Philosophical Logic (Helsinki: Societas Philosophica Fennica), 71–91.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Ilkka Niiniluoto 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ilkka Niiniluoto

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations