Justice and the Free Movement of Persons: Educational Mobility in the European Union and the United States

  • Andrea Sangiovanni
Part of the Jepson Studies in Leadership book series (JSL)

Abstract

The average cost of a university education in Britain is £7,355.1 The average student, however, only pays £3,255 in tuition fees, which means that more than half of students’ university education is subsidized by the general taxpayer. Five percent of these students—about sixty-five thousand —are residents in other EU member states who have come to the United Kingdom to study. In 2009, the total outlay from the British taxpayer to nonresident EU students was therefore about £650 million ($1.01 billion). If we also count the effective subsidies involved in tuition loans (arising from lower rates of interest and lower rates of recovery from EU students who move back to their home country), the figure rises to about £785 million ($1.22 billion).2 Nonresident international students from outside the European Union studying in the United Kingdom, on the other hand, pay nearly the full costs of their university education (barring some special cases).3 The difference between EU and non-EU students is the result of a landmark 1985 European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling, Gravier, which barred member states from charging higher rates of tuition to EU citizens. The court held that differential tuition fees, in addition to illegitimately discouraging the free movement of persons across EU borders, also discriminated on the basis of nationality and hence violated Article 7 of the Treaty of Rome.

Keywords

Member State Free Movement Welfare Benefit Collective Good Host State 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 5.
    There are interesting differences that stem from which part of the Constitution one conceives of the right as originating, but they are not relevant here. See Mark Strasser, “Privileges of National Citizenship: On Saenz, Same-Sex Couples, and the Right to Travel,” Rutgers Law Review 52 (1999): 553–588Google Scholar
  2. and Erika Nelson, “Unanswered Questions: The Implications Oì Saenz v. Roe for Durational Residency Requirements,” Kansas Law Review 49 (2001): 193–220. See also Justice Harlan’s dissent in Shapiro v. Thompson 394 US 618 (1969), 663ff.Google Scholar
  3. 26.
    Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, 2nd edn. (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 38.Google Scholar
  4. 32.
    See, for example, Christian Tomuschat, “Case C-85/96, María Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, Judgment of 12 May 1998, Full Court [1998] Ecr I-2691,” Common Market Law Review 37 (2000): 447–457: “Indeed, the European Community has not yet crossed the threshold to a true Social Union, where the peoples of the 15 Member States would be considered as just one community, mutually extending solidarity, where revenues and financial charges are shared irrespective of national boundaries. As yet, the Community enjoys no powers of legislation in the social field... The individual does not acquire social entitlements just by transferring his or her residence to another Member State is he or she does not belong to one of the categories specifically recognized as holders of a right of free movement” (454).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 36.
    Gareth Davies, “Higher Education, Equal Access, and Residence Conditions: Does EU Law Allow Member States to Charge Higher Fees to Students Not Previously Resident?” Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 12 (2005): 217–231 and Michael Dougan, “Cross-Border Educational Mobility and the Exportation of Student Financial Assistance,” European Law Review (2008): 723–738.Google Scholar
  6. 37.
    See, e.g., Charlotte O”Brien, “Real Links, Abstract Rights and False Alarms: The Relationship between the ECJ’s “Real Link” Case Law and National Solidarity,” European Law Review 5 (2008): 643–665.Google Scholar
  7. 40.
    Cf. fair play in John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999)Google Scholar
  8. and H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).Google Scholar
  9. 44.
    See, for example, A. Moravcsik, “In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (2002): 603–624;CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Giandomenico Majone, “Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed Polity,” European Law Journal 8 (2002): 319–339;CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. R. Dehousse, “European Institutional Architecture after Amsterdam: Parliamentary System or Regulatory Structure?,” Common Market Law Review 35 (1998): 595–627.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. On EU social policy, see Gráinne de Búrca, ed., EU Law and the Welfare State: In Search of Solidarity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Douglas A. Hicks and Thad Williamson 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andrea Sangiovanni

There are no affiliations available

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